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Contractual Tax Reform
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Abstract: One-size-fits-all taxation fails to accommodate diverse taxpayer
circumstances. This Article proposes allowing taxpayers to contract into
alternative tax regimes administered by private intermediaries. Participating
taxpayers would make payments to the intermediaries pursuant to contract, and the
intermediaries would be required to pay to the government at least as much as these
taxpayers would have paid the government otherwise. That amount is determined
based on the actual tax receipts of a control group, taxpayers who wish to contract
with an intermediary but instead are chosen at random to continue under the status
quo. These alternative tax regimes might better accommodate taxpayers’
preferences, leaving the taxpayers with greater utility, without reducing
government revenue. An intermediary could offer different substantive law,
different procedural rules, or both. Taxpayers, for example, might receive lower
tax rates in exchange for forgoing deductions that cause the taxpayer to engage in
socially wasteful behavior. Advances in artificial intelligence make contractual tax
reform feasible.
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The same body of tax law applies to all taxpayers.1 This Article proposes
upending this bedrock principle, allowing private intermediaries to offer alternative
tax regimes. The government would insist that it receive at least as much tax
revenue as it would have received under existing tax law, so the intermediaries
would have powerful incentives to find packages of tax changes that would benefit
individuals without lowering tax collections. For example, in exchange for lower
rates, businesspersons might forsake the deduction for business travel2 or might link
their cash register directly into the tax reporting system.3 Some taxpayers might
agree to procedural rules that favor the government, in exchange for smoother taxreform processing. Allowing some parents a deduction for childcare expenses
might make them more likely to work outside the home and thus actually increase
tax collections.4 Alternative tax-rate structures with higher inframarginal and lower
marginal rates might encourage some taxpayers to work harder, pay more taxes,
and yet be happier as a result.5
Contractual tax reform requires data about taxpayers that would help predict
how much they would pay in an alternative tax regime. Much of the tax literature
presumes that taxpayers have private information about themselves.6 Sometimes,
the tax system can harness that information by allowing private parties to choose
among different regimes.7 But for the exchanges suggested above, one cannot allow
all taxpayers to opt in, because those most willing to give up benefits would be
1

E.g., I.R.C. § 1(a) (“There is hereby imposed on the taxable income of… every married individual…”)
(emphasis added); id. § 11(a) (“A tax is hereby imposed for each taxable year on the taxable income of every
corporation.”) (emphasis added); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall
be uniform throughout the United States”); United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 79 (1983) (“Such taxes
must be uniform throughout the United States, and uniformity is achieved only when the tax operates with the
same force and effect in every place where the subject of it is found.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Taxpayers may make certain elections from a limited menu provided by tax law, see infra note 236 and
accompanying text, but they cannot order off the menu.
2

See Section I.A.1.
See Section I.C.2.
4
See Section I.A.2.
3

5

See Section I.B.2.
See ROBIN BOADWAY, FROM OPTIMAL TAX THEORY TO TAX POLICY 50 (2012) (“[A]symmetric information
has been a key feature of normative tax analysis, particularly the fact that the government is imperfectly
informed about relevant characteristics of private agents.”). Alex Raskolnikov, for example, suggests allowing
taxpayers to choose between a “deterrence regime” with high penalties and a “compliance regime” with
features such as binding arbitration. Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target
Tax Enforcement, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 689 (2009).
6

7

The goal of some proposals is to produce a separating equilibrium, where taxpayers have incentives to choose
regimes in a way that is consistent with social welfare. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Self-Selection and Pareto
Efficient Taxation, 17 J. PUB. ECON. 213, 230 (1982) (discussing a possible separating equilibrium). Those
committed to gaming the tax system will generally choose the former, while others choose the latter. Id. at
692–93 & 745–46.
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those least likely to use them. A businessperson who does not travel for business
would be happy to give up the deduction for business travel.8 Similarly, the goal
might be to find a married taxpayer who would reenter the workforce after having
children only in the absence of tax distortions.9 The challenge is to identify groups
of taxpayers who can be expected, on average, to pay at least as much tax in the
alternative tax regime.
Artificial intelligence (“AI”) may now make it possible in many cases to
identify such taxpayers. Three revolutions—in computing power, in the availability
of data, and in the computer algorithms used to analyze the data10—mean that
computers can increasingly predict human behavior with remarkable accuracy.11 As
early as 2011, the retailer Target Corp. famously sent coupons for baby clothes and
cribs to a teenager, whom its data scientists had predicted was pregnant.12 The
teenager’s father came to a Target store furious about the mailing, but later
apologized when he found out that his daughter was in fact pregnant.13 Since 2011,
artificial intelligence has grown ever more capable, and today, such anecdotes seem
unsurprising. Legal scholars take as granted that algorithms can make reasonably
accurate predictions, focusing instead on questions of when and how the legal
system should be able to rely on them.14
Even the best analysis will not provide foolproof predictions about how
different taxpayers will respond to alternative tax regimes. But tax law already
relies on predictive analytics. In the United States, the IRS has long used datadriven computer models to determine the most promising audit targets ex post.15
8

See Section I.A.1.

9

See Section I.A.2.
A notable advance has been the deep neural network. See Geoffrey E. Hinton, Learning Multiple Layers of
Representation, 11 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 428 (2007).
10

11

See, e.g., Steve Lohr, The A.I. Wave Is Here, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 2018, at F7; Carlos E. Perez, The Uncanny
Intuition
of
Deep
Learning
to
Predict
Human
Behavior,
Jan.
12,
2017,
https://medium.com/intuitionmachine/deep-learning-to-predict-human-behavior-a2cd2ce14132. See generally
CHRISTOPHER M. BISHOP, PATTERN RECOGNITION AND MACHINE LEARNING (2011) (describing the various
methods of computer-based prediction).
12
Charles Duhigg, Psst, You in Aisle 5, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2012, at MM30.
13
Id.
14

See, e.g., Judge Noel L. Hillman, The Use of Artificial Intelligence in Gauging the Risk of Recidivism, 58
JUDGES J. 36 (2019) (arguing that use of AI in sentencing may violate due process even if it is accurate); Sonia
K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. REV. 54 (2019) (arguing a
variety of legal tools to reduce the opacity of artificial intelligence); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale,
The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014) (urging those affected
adversely by predictions be given due process rights to challenge them).
15
The IRS has a highly confidential statistical methodology called the Discriminant Index Function (DIF) that
scores the likelihood of an audit that increases tax revenue; the higher the DIF score, the greater the probability
of being audited. IRS, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 4.1.3.2. The IRS also uses totally random audits to
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But tax law has never used AI or other data-driven models to optimize or target tax
rules ex ante, either to improve efficiency or to maximize tax revenues.16 Tax
scholars have ignored the possibility of optimizing tax law using data science.17
Perhaps the reason for this gap in the literature is justifiable fear that
government empowered to use AI to change individual tax regimes might make
serious errors or, more nefariously, favor some taxpayers and discriminate against
others. But this Article proposes alternative regimes entered into through voluntary
private contractual arrangements. Such an approach not only reduces the danger of
governmental abuse but also ensures that private parties have robust incentives to
identify areas in which available data allows sufficiently confident predictions.
Contractual tax reform would require careful implementation.18 Private
intermediaries would design alternative tax regimes and decide which taxpayers to
invite. These private intermediaries must have proper incentives to identify regimes
that improve taxpayer utility while producing at least as much tax revenues to the
government. Our proposal provides these incentives by randomly assigning some
taxpayers who would like to be subject to an alternative regime to a control group
subject to generally applicable tax law. This group’s tax receipts would determine
how much the intermediary must pay to the government. The design ensures that
the arrangement will not harm the government, and the requirement that taxpayers
affirmatively opt in ensures that taxpayers expect it to benefit them. It might seem
that the only losers are the taxpayers stuck in the status quo by random chance, yet
this Article will demonstrate how these taxpayers can benefit too.19

improve the data used in the DIF. Id. § 4.22.1.5(5). Scholars have discussed using AI to model tax avoidance
and ways to catch avoiders, again, ex post. E.g. Erik Hemberg et al., Tax Non-Compliance Detection Using CoEvolution of Tax Evasion Risk and Audit Likelihood in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 15TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 79 (2015).
16

Indeed, it is doubtful whether the IRS has the expertise or capacity to optimize tax law ex ante using artificial
intelligence. 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, OBJECTIVE REPORTS TO CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 123
(2016), https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/reports/fy-2017-objectives-report-to-congress/full-report (noting that
the IRS uses “data mining models,” amongst other techniques, to stop refunds on potentially false returns, but
has an unacceptably high rate of false positives); see also TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REVIEW
OF
THE
ELECTRONIC
FRAUD
DETECTION
SYSTEM
(Sept.
29,
2015),
https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2015reports/201520093fr.html (discussing the poor state of the
IRS’s technology).
17
The apparently sole exception is Christian Baker et al., A Big Data Approach to Optimal Sales Taxation
(NBER Working Paper No. 20130, May 2014), and that paper deals only with sales tax, not income tax or
corporate tax.
18

Contractual tax reform involves experimentation using real-world conditions, which is in stark contrast to
the laboratory-based experimentation into individuals’ behavior that is common in areas including taxation.
For a good review of laboratory-based experimentation, see James Alm & Sarah Jacobson, Using Laboratory
Experiments in Public Economics, 60 NAT’L TAX J. 129 (2007).
19

See infra text accompanying note 243.
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Suppose, for example, that a private intermediary called “Taxes, Inc.” hires
tax experts and AI experts to collaborate. The firm identifies one million candidate
taxpayers to invite to opt into an alternative tax regime. Taxes, Inc. would send
these taxpayers an invitation to opt in, along with disclosures about the upsides and
downsides of the alternative regime.20 Suppose that 100,000 of the invitees agree to
participate and are deemed suitable candidates after further voluntary disclosures
to Taxes, Inc. A randomly selected subset of these opting-in taxpayers (say, 10%,
meaning 10,000 taxpayers) would be assigned at random to the control group. But
the other 90,000 would be bound by the alternative tax regime; the alternative tax
regime would be a contract between them and Taxes, Inc. If the 90,000 taxpayers—
the “treatment group”—paid more than 9.0 times the taxes paid by the control
group, then Taxes, Inc., would receive the excess (or some fraction thereof) as
profits. But if the treatment group paid less than 9.0 times the taxes paid by the
control group, Taxes, Inc., would have to reimburse the government the difference
(or the same fraction thereof).21
Private intermediaries could offer alternative tax regimes to individuals or
to business entities like corporations.22 The alternative tax regimes could be purely
substantive, purely procedural, or a combination of both. Some limitations on
alternative tax regimes are desirable. Many tax benefits aim to achieve non-tax
policy goals.23 For example, the research and development (R&D) tax credit 24
encourages scientific and engineering expenditures. The underlying theory is that
businesses do not capture all the benefits of their R&D expenses,25 and so society
20

Regarding disclosures to avoid exploitation, see infra Section II.C.1.
Mathematical formulas other than fractions of the difference in collection are possible. The only constraint
in designing the formulas for what Taxes, Inc. receives for increased collections (or what Taxes, Inc. pays for
shortfalls) is that they must give Taxes, Inc. incentives to design alternative tax regimes that have an expected
value greater than the expected value of the status quo.
22
C corporations and certain types of trusts are examples of business entities that pay taxes. I.R.C. § 11
(imposing tax on C corporations); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (deeming a number of types of business entities
to be corporations); cf. I.R.C. § 641(a) (imposing tax on trusts). Other business entities, like partnerships and
S corporations, are not taxpaying entities, but rather “pass through” their income and other tax attributes to
their partners, shareholder, or other owners. I.R.C. § 701 (“A partnership as such shall not be subject to the
income tax imposed by this chapter. Persons carrying on business as partners shall be liable for income tax
only in their separate or individual capacities.”); id. § 1363(a) (“[A]n S corporation shall not be subject to the
taxes imposed by this chapter”).
23
See generally Borris Bittker, Accounting for Federal “Tax Subsidies” in the National Budget, 22 NAT’L TAX
J. 244 (1969); Cliff Fleming & Robert Peroni, Can Tax Expenditure Analysis Be Divorced from a Normative
Tax Base?: A Critique of the “New Paradigm” and Its Denouement, 30 VA. TAX REV. 135 (2010).
21

24

I.R.C. § 41; see also id. § 174 (allowing immediate deduction for R&D expenditures, in
contravention of the general principle of capitalization for expenditures creating multi-year
benefits).
25
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 112TH CONG., TAX EXPENDITURES: COMPENDIUM OF BACKGROUND
MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS 104 (Comm. Print 112-45, 2012) (“[B]usinesses in general
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benefits from favorable tax treatment of R&D.26 Similarly, many other tax
expenditures aim to encourage taxpayers to create positive externalities or to reduce
negative externalities. Examples include various tax benefits for higher education,27
clean energy,28 and homeownership.29 The simplest solution is for Congress simply
to bar alternative regimes that remove specified tax benefits or, particularly in early
implementations, to limit the scope of contractual tax reform to specific
provisions.30 Blocking some tax benefits will, of course, be less of an issue in
countries (or states) that make less use of tax benefits to further non-tax policy
goals.31 Though most of our examples will focus on the U.S. federal tax system
because of its familiarity, contractual tax reform might be as or more desirable in
other jurisdictions.
There are strong theoretical reasons to believe that welfare-improving
alternative tax regimes exist even in the U.S. federal tax system. This system is
extraordinarily expensive to comply with and to administer,32 yet it leaves hundreds
of billions of dollars owed to the government uncollected.33 And it creates massive
economic distortions. These administrative costs and inefficiencies are potential
gains that can be distributed among taxpayers, the government, and intermediaries,
so long as an intermediary is able to target its offers sufficiently well.
Tax rate schedules will often be a source of beneficial exchanges, because
the status quo balances two irreconcilable goals.34 The first goal, based on
conceptions of equity, is progressivity.35 Progressivity demands that higher-earners
should pay not merely higher tax than lower earners, but a higher percentage of

are unlikely to invest in R&D in amounts consistent with its social returns.”).
26
Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Can a Patent Box Promote Advanced Manufacturing?,
147 TAX NOTES 1347, 1347 (June 22, 2015) (“decades of research by leading economists indicates
that externalities from R&D not only exist but are very large”).
27

I.R.C. § 25A.
Id. §§ 45, 136, 179D
29
Id. § 163(h).
28

30

A drawback is that this may limit the most creative alternative regimes, such as those that do not
even use the concept of deductions. See, e.g., infra note 140 and accompanying text.
31
Countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, and South Korea have much lower levels of tax
expenditures than the United States. See JOE MINARIK, TAX EXPENDITURES IN OECD COUNTRIES
28 (2009), http://www.oecd.org/governance/budgeting/42976288.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
32

See Section I.C.1.

33

See Section I.C.2.
See Section I.B (giving examples of such exchanges based on tax rate schedules).
35
See BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES,
(1999 & Supp. 2016)
34

AND

GIFTS ¶ 3.4

CONTRACTUAL TAX REFORM

8

their earnings.36 As a result, the marginal tax rate a taxpayer pays (that is, the tax
on the last dollar of income) should be higher than the inframarginal rates (that is,
tax on lower dollars of income). The second goal, based on efficiency concerns, is
to minimize distortions from tax.37 Inframarginal tax rates are less likely to affect
taxpayers’ behavior than marginal rates, because each additional dollar of income
contributes less to utility than the prior dollar and because a unit of leisure time is
more valuable when there is less of it.38 Efficiency thus counsels toward low
marginal rates, even at the expense of higher inframarginal rates. Indeed, the least
distortionary tax is a lump sum tax with a zero marginal rate.39 Thus, the dilemma:
Progressivity requires that marginal rates increase with income; efficiency is best
served by lump sum taxation or low marginal rates.
These two goals are irreconcilable only if the same tax rate schedule applies
to all taxpayers.40 Contractual tax reform allows tailoring tax rate schedules to
taxpayers’ characteristics and preferences, enabling both progressivity and
efficiency.41 Tax schedules with relatively high inframarginal rates and low
marginal rates are possible under contractual tax reforms targeted to taxpayers’
circumstances. If AI makes possible identification of those who would accept such
alternative schedules and yet could expect to pay at least as much under them, then
contractual tax reform can offer substantial benefits to both the government and
taxpayers.42 Even if intermediaries can make confident predictions only that a small
set of taxpayers, such as taxpayers subject to an especially inefficient deduction,

36

See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 35, ¶ 3.5.3; Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for
Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (1952); Sarah Lawsky, On the Edge: Declining Marginal Utility
and Tax Policy, 95 MINN. L. REV. 904 (2011).
37
See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in
Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667 (1994) (noting that taxes may reduce efficiency by
distorting work choices).
38
Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L.
REV. 1905, 1947 (1987) (noting that “consumption and leisure have declining marginal utility”). Someone who
is on the margin of whether to work (and thus be a taxpayer) at all, however, may be sensitive to the tax rate
charged on the first dollars earned. See generally Emmanuel Saez, Optimal Income Transfer Programs:
Intensive Versus Extensive Labor Supply Responses, 2002 Q.J. ECON. 1039 (2002) (noting that the optimal
choice between or combination of Negative Income Tax and Earned Income Tax Credit programs depends on
behavioral responses at both the extensive margin, i.e., whether to work at all, and intensive margin, i.e., how
much to work). The existence of heterogeneity in behavioral responses enhances our broader argument for
allowing alternative tax regimes adapted to individual characteristics.
39
BOADWAY, supra note 6, at 71; id. at 143; id. at 182 (noting that lack of government information is reason
we do not have lump-sum taxes); accord Joseph E. Stiglitz, Self-Selection and Pareto Efficient Taxation, 17 J.
PUB. ECON. 213, 217 (1982) (analyzing lump-sum only taxation as the “first-best optimum” policy).
40
See I.R.C. § 1(a)-(d).
41
For an extensive discussion of relaxing the single-rate-schedule approach, see infra Section I.B.
42

See infra Sections I.B.1 & I.B.2 (discussing how such separation are possible).
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would benefit from an alternative tax regime while still paying higher taxes, the
benefits could be substantial for those taxpayers.
If contractual tax reform were sufficiently widespread, it might have broad
benefits beyond those who opt into alternative tax regimes. Congress, the IRS, and
scholars may learn from the success or failure of alternative tax regimes.43
Contractual tax reform might support experimentation with tax reform goals
previously thought to require universally applicable tax changes, such as moves to
mark-to-market taxation of securities in exchange for lower rates44 or replacement
of corporate taxes by government holdings of nonvoting corporate stock.45
The prior literature has considered the possibility that the government might
improve policy with randomized experiments in a variety of areas, 46 including tax
law.47 Other scholars, meanwhile, have proposed allowing private parties to opt out
of default economic regulation in areas such as securities law48 and bankruptcy,49
and a recent article suggests that corporations be allowed to appoint private firms
to serve the function of directors.50 But the literature on government
experimentation has ignored the literature on opting out of regulation and vice

43

Indeed, if contractual tax reform became common, the tax code in Title 26 of the U.S. Code might
come to be seen as a “penalty default rule.” Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). Lawmakers might be more
willing to enact cumbersome tax provisions if they know that affected taxpayers can contract around
it with alternative tax regimes that lack those provisions
44

“Mark-to-market” means that the securities (or other assets) are treated as if sold at the end of the year for
their fair market value. See David A. Weisbach, A Partial Mark-to-Market Tax System, 53 TAX L. REV. 95
(1999) (proposing a generalized version of this alternative regime, with different rates for assets like securities
marked-to-market than for assets not marked-to-market). But see Edward A. Zelinsky, For Realization: Income
Taxation, Sectoral Accretionism, and the Virtue of Attainable Virtues, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 861 (1997) (arguing
against any mark-to-market system).
45

See infra Section I.D (discussing this option).
See, e.g., Talia B. Gillis, Putting Disclosure to the Test: Toward Better Evidence-Based Policy, 28 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 31, 38 (2015) (consumer protection law); Zachary J. Gubler, Making Experimental Rules
Work, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 551, 558 (2015) (securities law); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism,
101 VA. L. REV. 65, 65 (2015) (patent law); Hannah J. Wiseman & Dave Owen, Federal Laboratories of
Democracy, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1119, 1152-68 (2018) (agricultural policy)
47
See Michael Abramowicz, Tax Experimentation, 71 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (on file with author).
46

48

See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J.
2359 (1998) (urging adoption of a federalist model of securities regulation modeled on the federalist system of
corporate governance).
49

See Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807 (1998)
(arguing that requiring firms to use a particular bankruptcy system increases the borrowing firm’s cost of
capital).
50
Stephen M. Bainbridge & M. Todd Henderson, Boards-R-Us: Reconceptualizing Corporate Boards, 66
STAN. L. REV. 1051 (2014).
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versa. The possibility that private parties might facilitate contracting around default
tax law has received no prior consideration.
Perhaps the closest suggestion is Saul Levmore’s proposal to “allow every
wealthy individual, at age sixty for example, to choose among revenue-neutral
combinations of income and estate tax rates.”51 Levmore does not explore the more
general question of how the government or private parties might identify alternative
tax regimes to apply to particular taxpayers. Meanwhile, Anthony Casey and
Anthony Niblett argue that developments in AI anticipate the increasing ability of
the government to fashion “micro-directives” responsive to circumstances,
combining the predictability of rules with the flexibility of standards, 52 and they
offer a brief application to tax law.53 But their ambition is for the law to take into
account diverse circumstances itself; they do not consider the possibility that
private parties might identify citizens who then may opt into particular alternative
legal rules.
We are not the first to consider allowing nongovernmental entities to create
tax policy in some way, however. The economist Erzo Luttmer proposed a
mechanism in which profit-maximizing firms redistribute income.54 The
government would assign employees at random to employers, each receiving the
same base salary.55 An employee may then enter into an agreement to work with
the employer, or can work for a third party and give the assigned employer a
government-set fraction of the amount earned.56 The lower this fraction, the greater
the an incentive to offer an attractive base salary, thus encouraging intrafirm income
redistribution. Luttmer’s proposal is impractical.57 Assigning employees at random
to employers is inconsistent with foundational commitments of liberal democracy.
Nonetheless, Luttmer’s proposal underscores that properly incentivized private
parties may be better situated than the government to assess individuals’ abilities
and thus to better offer them tax schedules.58 Our project similarly seeks to take
51

Saul Levmore, From Helmets to Savings and Inheritance Taxes: Regulatory Intensity, Information
Revelation, and Internalities, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 229, 247 (2014) (emphasis added).
52
Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards (U. Chi. Pub. L. Working Paper
No. 55, Nov. 20, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2693826.
53
Casey and Nisblett consider a tax authority using artificial intelligence “to provide advance tax rulings,”
indicating how the law would apply to particular individuals. Id. at 22.
54

Erzo F.P. Luttmer, Can Income
http://www.nber.org/~luttmer/privatize.pdf.
55
Id. at 5.
56
Id.

Redistribution

Be

Privatized?

(NBER

Draft,

2001),

57

Id. at 8 (“To make privatized redistribution feasible, many practical issues would need to be addressed
including opportunities for employment changes, bankruptcy, retirement rules and the age at which individuals
are matched to firms.”).
58

Id. at 7 (noting that this system gives employers “incentives to improve their assessments of workers’
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advantage of private information, but to allow taxpayers and private tax
intermediaries to freely choose one another.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I offers several examples of alternative
tax regimes that private intermediaries might offer to taxpayers. These examples
highlight inefficiencies from current one-size-fits-all tax law. Part II explores the
mechanics of how private intermediaries could offer alternative regimes to
taxpayers. It explains the responsibilities of intermediaries and how the government
can ensure that they will be able to pay their bills, and it also describes how the
government might prevent various manipulations, such as shifting income between
periods or changing tax filing status, and deal with complications such as tax
expenditures. Part III considers potential objections. Reliance on private
intermediaries necessitates some regulation to prevent financial or privacy abuses,
similar to existing financial and privacy regulation. Properly implemented,
contractual tax reform need not worsen inequality or horizontal inequity and in fact
could help reduce these problems. A brief conclusion follows.
I.

APPLICATIONS

The goal of this Article’s proposal is for some taxpayers to receive the
option of an alternative tax regime expected to leave the taxpayers better off and
increase the tax revenue received by the government (or at least keep tax revenues
constant). This Part will describe some hypothetical alternative regimes, while the
next Part explains the mechanisms of contractual tax reform.
A. Changing the Tax Base
In the U.S. income tax system, the “tax base” is taxable income: the
taxpayer’s gross income minus the taxpayer’s deductions.59 Any change to tax—
whether it be traditional tax reform or contractual tax reform—can expand the tax
base by expanding the definition of what is in gross income60 or by reducing the
available deductions.61 Conversely, a change to tax law can contract the tax base,
such as by offering a new deduction. Alternative tax regimes offered by private
abilities”). What Luttmer refers to as “incentive schedules” from assigned employers are economically the
same as tax schedules.
59
I.R.C. §§ 1, 11, 63(a).
60
The most obvious way to expand gross income is to contract the “exclusions” from gross income, which are
“a receipt or accrual that would, but for a specific exclusion provided by the Code or administrative action, be
included in a taxpayer's gross income.” WARREN, GORHAM & LAMONT, TAX DICTIONARY (2019 ed.). I.R.C.
sections 101 through 127 contain express exclusions.
61
Expanding the tax base is a commonly touted element of tax reform. See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON
TAX’N, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 6–11 (1987).
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intermediaries could offer expansions, contractions, or both, with the goal of
increasing overall tax revenues while still leaving the taxpayer better off.
1. Expanding the Base
Consider businesspeople A and B, who both have gross income of $140,000
and spend $40,000 per year on business travel to visit clients.62 Assume for
simplicity that both are subject to a flat 50% tax rate on all their taxable income.63
Although they appear identical, their business travel activities differ substantially:
A loves sightseeing, whereas B only conducts business. A’s $40,000 spent on
business travel generates merely $10,000 in gross income, but brings $20,000 worth
of personal utility, because the travel allows A to sightsee between business
meetings.64 It seems irrational for A to spend $40,000 on business travel that brings
in only $10,000 in profits and $20,000 in personal utility. But current tax law makes
such wasteful behavior entirely rational,65 since A can deduct the $40,000 in travel
expenses,66 reducing A’s tax bill by $20,000.67 A’s distorted behavior has cost the

62

See I.R.C. § 162(a)(2) (“There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses . . .
including . . . traveling expenses . . . while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business”).
63
This rate is a simplification and is higher than the rates one would expect under current law, where top federal
marginal tax rates are 39.6%, I.R.C. § 1(a)-(d). State tax rates, however, can add as much as 12.3%. CAL. REV.
& TAX. CODE § 17041.
64

See generally William A. Klein, The Deductibility of Transportation Expenses of a Combination Business
and Pleasure Trip—A Conceptual Analysis, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1099 (1966) (analyzing the problem of
deductibility of business travel that creates personal utility).
65

With respect to A, the costs of the business trip are $40,000 in actual expenses, plus the $5,000 in taxes paid
on the $10,000 in gross income generated by the travel. The total costs to A are thus $45,000. Meanwhile, A’s
benefits from the business trip are the $20,000 in personal enjoyment, plus $20,000 in taxes saved because the
business expenses are deductible, plus $10,000 in gross income. Thus A’s benefits of $50,000 exceed A’s
$45,000 in costs. A’s surplus from the travel is the difference, $5,000.
66
In theory, a deduction for business travel can be denied if the personal-consumption aspect is egregiously
large compared to the bona fide business motivations. But courts give taxpayers a wide berth on such matters.
See Palo Alto Town & Country Village, Inc. v. Commissioner, 565 F.2d 1388, 1390–91 (9th Cir. 1977)
(allowing lavish travel expense deduction upon showing that it was helpful in one instance to the taxpayer);
Henry v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 879, 884 (1961) (“In determining that which is ‘necessary’ to a taxpayer’s
trade or business, the taxpayer is ordinarily the best judge on the matter, and we would hesitate to substitute
our own discretion for his”). A’s sightseeing expenses would not be deductible since they are clearly personal
expenses. I.R.C. § 262. Whether the overall trip is treated as a deductible business trip or a personal trip is
based on the facts and circumstances, with weight given to factors as time spent on business versus personal
activities, not the amount of gross income earned from the trip. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(b).
67
We assumed for simplicity a 50% tax rate. A deduction of $40,000 for someone with a 50% tax rate results
in tax savings of 50% times $40,000, which equals $20,000.
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government $15,000 in lost tax revenue68 and made society as a whole $10,000
poorer.69
B’s business travel, by contrast, is all about business. By travelling, B earns
$50,000 in additional income from clients, but zero personal utility. B’s after-tax
benefit of the travel is $25,000, i.e., the additional $50,000 in income from clients,
reduced by the 50% tax rate. B would not travel for business without the
deductibility of travel expenses, because the $40,000 expense is greater than this
$25,000. With deductibility, the $40,000 in travel expenses has an after-tax cost of
only $20,000. B comes out $5,000 ahead by taking the travel, while the government
collects an additional $5,000 in tax revenue. The deductibility of B’s travel
expenses thus increases social efficiency by $10,000. Such behavior explains why
the tax code currently allows deducting business travel.
Allowing B to deduct business expenses makes society better off, while
allowing A the same deduction does the opposite. Under current law, the
government makes no effort to distinguish between A and B.70 Indeed, the
government currently has no way to observe that A enjoys $20,000 worth of
personal utility from the travel (from sightseeing), or to observe that B’s business
travel is all about business. The government also has no way to observe that A earns
merely $10,000 in income from clients by travelling, whereas B earns $50,000.
Contractual tax reform can address this problem. Private intermediaries
could offer both A and B an alternative tax regime, structured so that only those
taxpayers who inefficiently take advantage of travel deductions would opt in. For
example, both A and B could be offered an alternative tax regime where business
travel expenses are not deductible, in exchange for lowering the tax rate from 50%
to 45%. (Recall that to keep the math simple, we have assumed flat tax rates.)
Simple cost-benefit analysis shows that A will accept this alternative regime and
forgo all business travel,71 increasing A’s personal utility, increasing tax revenues,
and increasing overall social well-being. Meanwhile, B will not opt-in, thus sticking
with current law, also a socially efficient result.72
68

The travel resulted in gross income of $10,000 and a deduction of $40,000, for a decrease in taxable income
of $30,000. At the 50% tax rate, the government has lost $15,000 in tax revenue.
69
As shown supra note 65, A’s net benefit from the travel expenses is $5,000, and as shown supra note 67, the
government lost $15,000 in tax revenue. The $10,000 is the deadweight loss to society.
70
See authorities supra note 66.
71
Under current law, when A takes the deductible travel, A has gross income of $140,000, $40,000 in deductible
travel expenses, leading to taxable income of $100,000 and after-tax income of $50,000. Adding in the $20,000
in personal utility from the travel, A has total utility of $70,000. But by opting for the alternative regime and
not taking the business travel, A will have gross income of $130,000, no deductions (since A no longer travels),
and thus taxable income of $130,000. The alternative regime provides a 45% rate, leaving 55% of A’s income
available after taxes. 55% of $130,000 is $71,500, which is $1,500 greater than A’s utility under current law.
72

Meanwhile, under current law, when B takes the deductible travel, B has taxable income of $100,000 (i.e.,
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Crucially, under the alternative regime, the taxes collected from A will
increase by $8,500.73 Although the alternative regime lowers the tax rate from 50%
to 45%, taking away the deduction for business travel – a form of broadening the
tax base – more than makes up for the lowered tax rate. This $8,500 in additional
tax revenue would likely more than cover any costs of administering the alternative
tax regime. Some portion of the $8,500 would go to the private tax intermediary,
with the remainder going into government coffers.
Of course, not every taxpayer should have the opportunity to opt into this
alternative tax regime. Consider a taxpayer C, who never takes business travel. C
will happily give up the right to deduct travel expenses, in exchange for tax rates
reduced from 50% to 45%. But for C, this alternative tax regime would be a pure
windfall, providing lower taxes but zero social benefit. The private intermediaries
must not only design good alternative regimes, but also invite only taxpayers who,
if they opt in, are likely to increase both tax collections and social welfare.
The most straightforward approach is likely for the private intermediary to
consider past travel expenses, offering the alternative tax regime only to those
taxpayers who have taken substantial travel-expense deductions in prior years.74
But private intermediaries could feed much more sophisticated, detailed, useful
data to their AI. For example, taxpayers who use their credit card on business trips
to pay for museum admission fees or sightseeing tours likely receive higher
personal utility from business travel. Moreover, since someone who takes lots of
for-pleasure travel presumably also gains more utility from business travel, data on
$140,000 gross income minus $40,000 deductible travel expenses), leading to after-tax income of $50,000. B
has no additional personal utility from the travel. If B is subject to the alternative regime and nonetheless still
takes the travel, then B will have taxable income of $140,000, which, with the 45% alternative tax rate, leaves
$77,000 after taxes. Subtracting the $40,000 in travel expenses, which would not be deductible under the
alternative regime, B is left with only $37,000, which is much worse than the $50,000 under current law.
Meanwhile, if B takes the alternative regime and does not take the travel, then B will have gross income of just
$90,000, since B will lose $50,000 in gross income from clients by not travelling. With the 45% alternative tax
rate, that leaves $49,500, which is less than the $50,000 under the current law. Thus, B will not opt for the
alternative regime.
73

Under current law, A took and deducted the business travel, resulting in taxable income of
$100,000 and taxes collected of $50,000 at the 50% rate. But under the alternative regime, A will not take the
business travel, and thus will lose $10,000 in gross income from clients, but will end up with taxable income
of $130,000. At the 45% rate, that results in $58,500 in taxes collected, which is $8,500 greater than the $50,000
under current law.
74
More sophisticated methods of deciding whom to invite to opt in would likely have substantial benefits.
Suppose that taxpayer D has the same observable characteristics as A and B, with business travel expenses of
$40,000 and gross income of $140,000. But suppose that D has already made plans to switch from travelling
to meet clients in person to using teleconferencing to conduct the same meetings. D would happily opt-into the
alternative tax regime, producing a windfall to D at the expense of tax revenues. Artificial intelligence can help
predict which taxpayers likely would change their behavior without the alternative tax regime. Companies that
market teleconferencing services make use of AI to predict who is most likely to buy their services in lieu of
business travel, and a private tax intermediary should be able to identify the same taxpayers also using AI.
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for-pleasure travel patterns also might give some indication of a taxpayer’s personal
utility from business trips. The higher the personal utility a taxpayer receives from
business travel, the more likely that the deductibility of business travel is creating
distortions, as with the example of taxpayer A. It thus likely makes more sense—
both in terms of additional tax revenue and social welfare—for a private
intermediary to offer the alternative tax regime to such taxpayers.
Of course, existing data cannot provide a final answer to questions of which
taxpayers should receive the option of the alternative tax regime. Actual
experimentation in the real world by private intermediaries would generate
experience and additional data.
2. Contracting the Base
Scholars have long recognized that tax law hinders gender equality by
discouraging mothers from staying in (or reentering) the workforce.75 Consider a
woman who earns $30,000 per year and has a husband who earns a great deal more
than that. Suppose that the marginal tax rate applicable to all of the wife’s taxable
income is 50%.76 The couple then has children. The woman faces a decision: stop
working to care for the children77 or continue working but pay $20,000 per year for
childcare. Childcare expenses are not deductible,78 so the after-tax benefit of
continuing to work is $15,000, which is $5,000 less than the cost of childcare.
Assuming that she acts solely based on present economic considerations and
receives no utility (or disutility) from work, the woman will rationally stop
working. This is inefficient. Society loses $10,000 because the wife is no longer
contributing $30,000 worth of labor, which would cost only $20,000 in childcare.
75

See Shannon Weeks McCormack, Postpartum Taxation and the Squeezed Out Mom, 105 GEO. L.J. 1323
(2017) (discussing problem and suggesting solutions).
76
In most marriages, the two spouses file a joint return. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 35, ¶ 111.5.2. With
joint returns, the lower earner pays higher marginal tax rates than the low earner would pay if single. Id. Thus
the application of the assumed top marginal rate to the wife’s taxable income in this example is not unrealistic,
despite her low gross income. Of course, the problem exists even with lower marginal rates, with a
concomitantly smaller tax distortion.
77
Care provided by a taxpayer to his or her own children in the home is not taxed. It is the paradigmatic
example of untaxed “imputed income” under longstanding U.S. income tax principles. See BITTKER & LOKKEN,
supra note 35, ¶ 5.3.2.
78
I.R.C. § 262(a) (“Except as otherwise expressly provided … no deduction shall be allowed for personal,
living, or family expenses.”); Smith v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939); cf. Shannon Weeks McCormack,
Overtaxing the Working Family: Uncle Sam and the Childcare Squeeze, 114 MICH. L. REV. 559 (2016) (arguing
for allowing deductibility). Congress has provided a meager dependent-care tax credit worth only $600 per
year in this situation. I.R.C. § 21; see BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 35, ¶ 37.2.2. Alternatively, taxpayers
whose employers provide a dependent-care flexible spending account can exclude up to $5,000 in childcare
expenses. See I.R.C. § 129 (excluding employer-provided dependent-care assistance); I.R.C. § 125 (authorizing
flexible spending accounts).
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Government, society, and the couple would all benefit from making their childcare
deductible, which would change her after-tax benefit of continuing to work to
$25,000,79 which exceeds the $20,000 cost of childcare.
Why then does the tax code not already allow a deduction for childcare
expenses? Because many mothers work and pay for childcare without a deduction.
Allowing such mothers to deduct childcare would give them a tax windfall. For
example, suppose that the mother in the example above was earning $50,000 rather
than $30,000. She might then rationally continue working even without childcare
being deductible.80 Allowing her to deduct childcare would result in a tax windfall
of $10,000, without furthering either economic efficiency or gender equity. As
another example, suppose once again that the mother earned only $30,000, but that
she received non-monetary personal satisfaction worth $6,000 from going to work
and getting out of the house. That benefit would cause the mother to continue
working, even without childcare being deductible.81 For this taxpayer, a deduction
for childcare would also result in a tax windfall.
Contractual tax reform can solve this problem. Private intermediaries
should offer the alternative tax regime, where childcare is deductible, only to
married taxpayers for whom the deduction seems likely to make the difference
between both spouses continuing to work or not. Even without extensive computing
power and AI, a private intermediary might be able to identify such taxpayers by
looking only at both spouses’ pre-child income, the couple’s marginal tax rate, and
the cost of childcare near the taxpayers. But, using AI, private intermediaries might
target the invitations to opt in even more precisely, projecting income potential.82
Moreover, AI could even be used to estimate the noneconomic utility (or disutility)
the mother would receive from getting out of the house to go to work, just as
marketers use AI to aim products and services at new mothers.
Antidiscrimination concerns might limit the variables that an artificial
intelligence model could incorporate. The sex of each member of the couple
(including whether the couple is same-sex) may be highly predictive,83 but there are
79

The wife would earn $30,000 in additional gross income, but the couple could deduct the $20,000 in childcare
costs, resulting in additional taxable income of just $10,000. The couple would pay $5,000 in taxes on the
$30,000 in earnings, leaving $25,000 in after-tax benefit.
80
In this example, the after-tax benefit to the mother of continuing to work is $25,000, which is the earnings
of $50,000 minus the 50% in taxes. The cost of continuing to work is $20,000, the cost of the childcare. Thus,
the mother will have $5,000 to spend after paying for childcare.
81
In this example, the after-tax benefit of continuing to work is $21,000, i.e., the $15,000 income after taxes
plus the $6,000 in noneconomic personal utility from working. The $20,000 cost of childcare is less than this.
82
See discussion infra note 113 and accompanying text (noting data-based predictions of income).
83
D’VERA COHN ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CENTER, AFTER DECADES OF DECLINE, A RISE IN STAY-AT-HOME
MOTHERS 29 (2014), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2014/04/Moms-At-Home_04-08-2014.pdf
(presenting survey data showing that mothers are much more likely than fathers to stop working, take
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arguments against considering sex. A regime that results in more tax rate reductions
for women, even if motivated by the good intention of increasing gender-equality
in the workforce, would reinforce the stereotype that women prefer caring for
children, and thus need inducements to work outside the home.84 The possibility
that AI might perpetuate discrimination has received great attention recently, 85 and
this concern may be so weighty that some strategies offered by private
intermediaries should be prohibited. Such concerns are a fertile area for future
scholars.
Beyond childcare, private intermediaries offering alternative tax regimes
could improve efficiency by granting other deductions or exclusions that entice
taxpayers into the workforce or into accepting higher-paying jobs. Some possible
examples among many include targeted deductions for home-office expenses,86 the
cost of work clothing,87 and commuting expenses.88 Such expenses are often not
currently deductible, under the theory that these expenses are usually mostly
personal, but that may vary across taxpayers and expenses. The tax code seeks to
accommodate this, sometimes allowing partial deductibility89 and at other times
making fine distinctions about what is personal and what is not.90 But private
intermediaries might account for individual circumstances, such as the importance
of clothing to particular jobs or the availability of housing near a workplace.
Alternative tax regimes, meanwhile, need not make a binary decision between
allowing a deduction and disallowing it. Rather, an alternative tax regime might

significant time off, or reduce their work hours to care for children), .
84
See Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 729–34 (2003) (criticizing parental-leave policies
that privileged maternity leave as reinforcing gender stereotypes).
85
E.g.,
JULIA ANGWIN ET AL., PROPUBLICA, MACHINE BIAS
(May
23,
2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing; Kate Crawford,
Artificial Intelligence’s White Guy Problem, NY TIMES, June 26, 2016, at SR11.
86
See I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1) (allowing deductions for limited home office expenses). For example, a lawyer who
has children might be enticed to continue practicing by allowing deductions relating to adding and maintaining
an alcove in an existing children’s playroom as a home office, which would not currently be deductible. Id.
(requiring that use be “exclusive”).
87
See Pevsner v. Commissioner, 628 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1980) (disallowing deductions for employee purchases
of job-required clothing in just about all situations).
88

See Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 (1945) (based on predecessor to I.R.C. § 262 denying deduction
for personal, family, and living expenses). Similarly, consider a taxpayer who has a more promising job in
another state, but who is held back from moving due to negative home equity in her house. There could be an
exclusion from such a taxpayer’s gross income when the new employer repays the taxpayer’s negative home
equity, which currently is not excludable. See I.R.C. §§ 217(b) & 132(a)(6) & (g).
89
I.R.C. § 274(n) (allowing deduction for only 50% of most business meal expenses).
90
Compare Pevsner v. Commissioner, 628 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1980) (deductibility of cost of clothing worn to
work determined based on objective standards), with Bernardo v. Commissioner, 88 T.C.M. (CCH) 191 (2004)
(using subjective standards for same).
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result in partial deductibility of certain expenses,91 in exchange for a small increase
in tax rates.
B. Accommodating Other Sources of Heterogeneity
The previous section discussed how private intermediaries might offer
alternative tax regimes that change the tax base to accommodate taxpayer’s diverse
situations, such as preferences for business travel or for working outside the home.
This section considers alternative tax regimes that accommodate diverse taxpayer
preferences in more radical ways than just changing the tax base. Specifically, this
section addresses two common sources of taxpayer diversity: differences in
earnings potential and differences in preferences for work versus leisure. As in the
previous Section, the alternative tax regimes should aim to increase the taxpayers’
utility (the overall satisfaction they derive from their work, leisure, and post-tax
earnings), while resulting in at least as much tax revenue to the government.
1. Earnings Potential
A central shortcoming of existing tax systems is that the government
observes only taxpayers’ income. Income is the product of both effort and earnings
potential, yet the government generally cannot measure either.92 How much of a
taxpayer’s earnings were due to her earnings potential (which the economics
literature generally calls “ability”), and how much were due to her efforts? The
government generally cannot tell. If the government knew each taxpayer’s earnings
potential, it could implement the “first-best” system wherein each taxpayer’s only
tax burden would be a lump sum based on earnings potential.93 Such lump-sum
taxes would be efficient, since the marginal tax rate would be zero, removing tax
distortions on work decisions.94 This approach would be equitable too, imposing
higher burdens on those most able to pay.95 For example, a surgeon might be
charged a single lump-sum $100,000 tax bill, and then pay zero additional tax,
preventing tax from distorting her work decisions.

91

See Klein, supra note 64 (arguing for such bifurcation with business travel expenses); I.R.C. § 274(n)
(allowing part deductibility of most business meals).
92
E.g., James A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38 REV. ECON. STUD.
175 (1971); see also N. Gregory Mankiw et al., Optimal Taxation in Theory and Practice, 23 J. ECON. PERSP.
147, 161 (2009) (“Mirrlees . . . identified the heart of the problem of tax design to be the tax authority’s lack
of information about individuals’ abilities.”).
93
Mankiw et al., supra note 92, at 149–50.
94
Id. at 149.
95

Id. at 149–50.
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Because the government cannot measure earnings potential, such a firstbest system is impossible. But the tax system can be improved by incorporating
estimates of earnings potential.96 George Akerlof famously proposed using easily
observable personal characteristics—which he called “tags”—that correlate with a
taxpayer’s earnings potential, to adjust the tax burden.97 Examples of “tags” that
could be used include educational attainment, earnings history, age, and I.Q.98
Taxpayers possessing characteristics associated with higher earnings potential
would have higher tax rates than those without the characteristic. The underlying
theory is that those with higher earnings potential can earn more with less effort,
and so total social utility is maximized by charging higher taxes on those with
higher earnings potential.99
N. Gregory Mankiw and Matthew Weinzierl applied tagging to height.100
Being taller correlates with earnings potential, with every additional inch of height
as an adult being associated with a 1.8% increase in wages. 101 Because tall people
can earn income more easily than short people, the authors suggested, total
economic utility would be maximized by charging higher income tax rates on taller
people than on shorter people. Such tagging would redistribute income from the tall
to the short, thus improving equity, while improving efficiency by equalizing the
marginal benefits of consumption across people.
96

Economists have developed mechanisms beyond those discussed in the main text, though often complex and
impractical ones, to allow sorting. For example, Joseph Stiglitz has proposed using the threat of randomizing
tax rates for those who appear to the government to be low-earnings-potential, while not randomizing rates for
those who declare themselves to be high- earnings-potential. See Stiglitz, supra note 7. Under the reasonable
assumption that those with higher earnings potential are more risk averse, this randomization encourages highearnings-potential individuals to fulfill their full potential, contributing more to the economy and to tax
revenues. Those additional tax revenues can compensate the lower-earnings-potential individuals so that they
are better off despite the randomization.
97
George A. Akerlof, The Economics of “Tagging” as Applied to the Optimal Income Tax, Welfare Programs,
and Manpower Planning, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 8 (1978).
98
Mirrlees, supra note 92, at 175 (identifying some possible types of tagging, thus laying the groundwork for
Akerlof’s tagging analysis); Mankiw et al., supra note 92, at 161 (noting that Mirrlees thus laid the groundwork
for tagging).
99
There are various different utility functions that a social planner might aim to maximize, although the most
common is maximizing total social utility (which is the same as average social utility). See Mankiw et al., supra
note 92, at 148.
100

N. Gregory Mankiw & Matthew Weinzierl, The Optimal Taxation of Height: A Case Study of Utilitarian
Income Redistribution, 2 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 155 (2010); see also Alberto Alesina, Andrea Ichino &
Loukas Karabarbounis, Gender-based Taxation and the Division of Household Chores, 3 AM. ECON. J.: ECON.
POL’Y 1 (2011) (applying tagging to gender, with men receiving higher marginal tax rates).
101

Nicola Persico, Andrew Postlewaite & Dan Silverman, The Effect of Adolescent Experience on Labor
Market Outcomes: The Case of Height, 112 J. POL. ECON. 1019 (2004). This finding is based on the wages of
white adult males, to avoid differences in race and gender. Timothy A. Judge & Daniel M. Cable, The Effect
of Physical Height on Workplace Success and Income: Preliminary Test of a Theoretical Model, 89 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 428 (2004) find similar results when controlling for gender, weight, and age.
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Mankiw and Weinzierl leave open the possibility that the seeming absurdity
of their proposal reveals a flaw in the dominant utilitarian optimal taxation
framework.102 Their proposal may simply highlight that the tax system generally
does not consider information other than income, because most such information
would be far more difficult to collect than height. A limitation of tagging is that it
provides taxpayers no incentives to reveal hidden information. Tagging depends on
observable information. The tax authority would need to require taxpayers to reveal
information that taxpayers may consider personal, and the tax authority would also
need to enforce honest reporting.
By contrast, allowing private intermediaries to offer alternative tax regimes
would encourage taxpayers to reveal information in two ways. First, taxpayers
would implicitly reveal a great deal of information by deciding whether (or not) to
opt into an alternative tax regime that a private intermediary has offered them.
Second, the private intermediaries can require that taxpayers provide private
information (e.g., their college major and GPA) as a prerequisite for being allowed
to opt into an alternative tax regime. Contractual tax reform thus provides a
systematic framework for revealing and using such information, while still leaving
taxpayers with the option of not sharing information at all, if they so choose.
Another explanation for the existing tax system’s failure to embrace tagging
is that it generally involves taking from one group (e.g., the tall) and giving to
another group (e.g., the short). In other words, tagging is Kaldor-Hicks efficient,
increasing total social utility, but tagging is generally not Pareto efficient, since
some taxpayers (e.g., the tall) lose from the policy.103 Politically, tagging is difficult
to implement, because high-earnings-potential groups like the tall and the educated
will be motivated to organize politically to fight it.104 By contrast, contractual tax
reform is Pareto efficient because taxpayers must opt in, and only those taxpayers
who foresee that an alternative tax regime will leave them better off will opt-in.
This opting-in thus can separate out high-earnings-potential taxpayers from those
with low earnings potential.
Consider the following example. Suppose for simplicity that the default tax
system105 has just two tax brackets: all taxable income between zero dollars and
$50,000 is taxed at 10%, while all taxable income above $50,000 is taxed at 40%.
102

The utilitarian framework does not seem to leave any role for considerations of horizontal equity. See, e.g.,
Mankiw & Weinzierl, supra note 100, at 174. But Mankiw and Weinzierl ask rhetorically, “Why would society
sacrifice potentially large gains for its average member to preserve equal treatment of individuals within an
arbitrarily-defined group?” Id. at 175.
103
Mankiw and Weinzierl show that height-sensitive taxation could be Pareto efficient relative to a regime that
does not take height into account, but that the magnitude of the Pareto improvement would be small, with
Pareto-improving height-based taxes involving only a few dollars. Id. at 172–73.
104
Perhaps largely for this reason, tagging’s use has largely been restricted to negative taxation, such as welfare
benefits. See Mankiw et al., supra note 92, at 163.
105

Current U.S. federal income tax has seven tax brackets. See I.R.C. § 1(a)-(d) & (i).
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Consider two individuals who both make $100,000 per year: H, who has high
earnings potential, and L, who has low earnings potential. To earn this income
despite having low earnings potential, L toils long hours; meanwhile, H earns this
income working only modest hours. For L, we assume that a lower marginal rate
would be unlikely to induce harder work, since L is already working quite hard and
the disutility from cutting into L’s scarce remaining free time would discourage
further effort. But for H, a lower marginal rate could quite likely induce harder
work, since H is not currently working hard and, being high-earnings-potential, can
earn additional money with relatively little additional effort.
Suppose that both H and L were offered an alternative tax regime that
involved a lump-sum payment of $20,000, plus a mere 10% marginal tax rate on
all income. This alternative rate schedule is a simple example of higher
inframarginal rates and lower marginal rates. How would H and L react?
Two diagrams below explain their reactions. These diagrams build on the
existing economic literature that models taxpayers’ preferences for after-tax
income versus leisure.106 These models make the generally reasonable assumption
that taxpayers derive more utility from both having more after-tax income and more
leisure.107 For any taxpayer and any level of achievable utility, a convex function
called an “indifference curve” represents all combinations of pre-tax income (which
is earned by a combination of effort and earnings potential) and after-tax income
(which is available for consumption) that achieve the same level of utility. The
higher the indifference curve, the higher the level of utility achieved by the
taxpayer.
Figure 1 illustrates high-earnings-potential H’s behavior under both existing
law and the alternative regime. The horizontal axis is pre-tax income, while the
vertical axis is the income left after taxes, available for consumption. The dashed
line is the existing tax-rate schedule. This line is “kinked” because the existing taxrate schedule in our hypothetical has two different brackets: 10% and then 40%.
The slope of this tax schedule is 0.9 up to $50,000 in pre-tax income (because the
government takes the remaining 0.1 or 10%), but then has the “kink,” taking the
slope 0.6 beyond $50,000 (because the government takes the remaining 0.4 or
40%). By contrast, the straight gray line is the alternative regime’s tax-rate
schedule, which starts at negative $20,000, because that is the lump-sum payment
that must be made in the alternative regime. The line then has a slope of 0.9 at every
amount of pre-tax income (because the government always takes the remaining
10%). The two solid black, curved lines are H’s two relevant indifference curves.
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Stiglitz, supra note 7, at 216–18.
Id. at 216 (assuming “∂Ui/∂Ci > 0,” which means utility U goes up as consumption C (i.e., after-tax income)
goes up, and assuming that “∂Ui/∂Li < 0,” which means utility U goes down as hours worked L (which “could
equally well be interpreted as being effort”) goes up).
107
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Figure 1: Model of how high-earnings-potential H
responds to the alternative tax schedule
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tax schedule
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Pre-tax income

H benefits from opting-into the alternative regime, which causes H to work
harder and earn a pre-tax income of $120,000, with $88,000 left after taxes under
the alternative regime. This combination of higher effort and additional after-tax
income (increasing from $75,000 to $88,000) makes H happier, shown by the
higher indifference curve. Meanwhile, the government has increased the tax it
collects from H from $25,000 under existing law to $32,000 under the alternative
tax regime. Allowing H to opt in results in a win-win for both H and the
government.
By contrast, Figure 2 illustrates low-earnings-potential L’s reaction to the
alternative tax regime. The crucial difference is L’s indifference curve. It is steep,
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since additional after-tax income does little to compensate for cutting into L’s
already scarce hours of leisure.108
Figure 2: Model of how low-earnings-potential L
responds to the alternative tax schedule
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The indifference curve that L achieves under current law is already higher
than the alternative regime’s tax schedule, at all possible levels of pre-tax income.
Being taxed under the alternative regime would thus lower L’s utility, so L will not
be interested in opting-into the alternative tax regime. Intuitively, L already works
so hard to earn $100,000 in pre-tax income that the alternative rate schedule would
leave L worse off (hence, L will not opt in).
By offering the same alternative rate schedule to both H and L—both of
whom currently earn $100,000—a private intermediary can determine which has
high earnings potential and which has low earnings potential. Moreover, the
alternative rate schedule simultaneously makes H happier and raises more tax
revenue from H.
108

Id. at 217–18 (“individuals of higher ability have flatter indifference curves . . . the increase in consumption
that is required to compensate an individual for a given increase in before tax income is smaller for the more
able, since to obtain the given increase in before tax income he needs to forgo less leisure.”). Recall that the
economics literature uses the term “ability” where we have been using the term “earnings potential.”
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The danger in offering such an alternative tax schedule is that opportunistic
taxpayers might take advantage of it. Suppose that opportunistic taxpayer O earns
$100,000 before taxes, but knows that his income is about to shoot upwards to
$125,000 next year because of a coming promotion. Offering the alternative tax
regime to O would result in a windfall for O at the expense of government
revenues.109 This is where artificial intelligence plays a role. Artifical intelligence
can help identify which taxpayers might increase their work effort for higher aftertax pay, and which taxpayers are likely to receive salary increases regardless of tax
regime. The private intermediary has a strong financial incentive to find data and
analyze it using AI to distinguish O from H and L – and to not invite O to opt into
the alternative tax regime.
2. Work vs. Leisure Preferences
Even taxpayers with identical earnings potential may differ in their
preferences for leisure versus after-tax income. Contractual tax reform can
accommodate this diversity to offer alternative tax regimes that leave both
taxpayers and the government better off. Suppose for simplicity—as in the previous
section—that the existing tax system has just two tax brackets: all taxable income
between zero dollars and $50,000 is taxed at 10%, while all taxable income above
$50,000 is taxed at 40%. Assume that under the existing tax system, taxpayers A
and B both maximize their utility by putting in 40 hours of effort, thus earning
$100,000 in taxable income and paying $25,000 in taxes.110 A private intermediary
offers both an alternative tax regime with a single, flat rate of 25% on all income.
This alternative tax regime imposes the exact same tax liability—$25,000—on the
taxpayers if they continue to earn $100,000. But they may not.
Assume that A opts in this alternative regime and maximizes her utility by
working 10 more hours per week, thus earning $120,000 instead of $100,000. This
outcome would result in $5,000 in additional tax revenues and $15,000 in additional
after-tax money for A. It is a win-win for tax revenues and for A. This example
demonstrates how offering alternative tax regimes can increase the work incentives
of those taxpayers for whom lower marginal rates—and hence a higher return to
additional work—would be worth the reduction of leisure. In effect, A has received
lower marginal rates on additional income (decreased to 25% from 40%) in

109

Under generally applicable tax law, O would have to pay taxes of 10% on the first $50,000 of income (i.e.,
$5,000) plus 40% on the remaining $150,000 (i.e., $60,000), for a total of $65,000. By contrast, under the
alternative tax regime, O would have to pay the lump-sum of $20,000 plus 10% of the $200,000 income (i.e.,
$20,000), for a total of only $40,000, which is a $25,000 windfall to O.
110

10% times the first $50,000 in income results in $5,000 in taxes. 40% times the next $50,000 in
income results in $20,000 in taxes. Adding the $5,000 and $20,000 in taxes gives total taxes of
$25,000.
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exchange for higher rates on her inframarginal income (increased to 25% from 10%
on the first $50,000) dollars.
Suppose that B declines to opt into the alternative tax regime. Why might B
not opt in? B may simply not have the opportunity to earn more than $100,000
under any circumstances. Maybe B has a salaried government job that does not
allow for bonuses, meaning B would have to change jobs to earn more than
$100,000. Maybe B is covered by a collective bargaining agreement fixing hours
and compensation. Or, B may have time commitments outside of work (e.g.
children, hobbies) that make working more than 40 hours unacceptable. Regardless
of the reason, the alternative tax regime has caused A and B to reveal their divergent
preferences for after-tax income versus leisure, with A, B, and tax revenues all left
either just as well off or better off.
Two simple diagrams below demonstrate how A and B can have different
preferences for after-tax income versus leisure—and thus why A chooses the
alternative tax regime while B does not. Figure 3 illustrates A’s behavior under both
existing law and the alternative regime. The diagram is similar to Figures 1 and 2,
except that the alternative tax regime’s rate schedule is different, represented below
by the straight gray line. This line has a slope of 0.75 at every amount of pre-tax
income (because the government always takes the remaining 0.25 or 25%).
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Figure 3: Model of how A responds to alternative tax schedule
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Under existing law, A maximizes her utility by working so that the existing
rate schedule (i.e., the “kinked” dashed line) intersects her highest possible
indifference curve (corresponding to highest possibility utility). A does this by
working enough to earn $100,000 in pre-tax income, leaving her with $75,000 in
after-tax income. But with the alternative rate schedule (the gray line), there is a
higher indifference curve that intersects the gray line, where A earns $120,000 in
pre-tax income, leaving her with $90,000 in after-tax income. A would opt into the
alternative regime, choosing to work the extra 10 hours per week and getting more
utility.
Why would B not opt-into the alternative regime?111 Figure 4 illustrates
why. B’s indifference curves are quite different than A’s.

111

Most of the tax literature assumes, unrealistically, that all taxpayers have the same utility functions with
respect to after-tax income and leisure. See BOADWAY, supra note 6, at 186. Contractual tax reform relaxes this
unrealistic assumption.
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Figure 4: Model of why B does not choose alternative tax schedule
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The indifference curve including B’s current work choice has a “kink” at a
pre-tax income of $100,000, so that earning any more than $100,000 would require
much higher after-tax income to result in the same utility. The alternative rate
schedule does not intersect any higher indifference curve, meaning that there is no
way that the alternative regime can give B a higher utility than existing law. As a
result, B will not opt into the alternative regime, thus revealing—and
accommodating—B’s different preferences from A.
Opportunistic taxpayers might try to take advantage of the option of the
alternative regime to minimize taxes. For example, suppose that taxpayer C
currently earns $100,000, just like A and B, subject to $25,000 in tax under the
existing rate schedules. But suppose that C knew that her employer was already
planning to raise her compensation from $100,000 to $120,000 next year, without
C needing to work any harder. When viewed in terms of the model presented in
Figures 3 and 4, C’s impending pay raise results in a shift of C’s “indifference
curves” to the right, as the same amount of effort results in greater pre-tax income.
C could opportunistically opt-into the alternative tax regime with a flat 25% rate,
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and save $3,000 in taxes with no additional effort.112 If offered to C, the alternative
tax regime is not Pareto-efficient, giving C a windfall at the expense of government
tax revenues.
Private intermediaries would have an incentive to use all available data and
AI to identify taxpayers like C and not to offer them the opportunity to opt into this
alternative tax regime. For example, taxpayers such as A and B may be in
professions with stable incomes, whereas C’s profession may offer frequent upticks
in compensation. As another example, C may have just completed a new
professional certification that would naturally foreshadow a pay increase. Or, C
may have engaged in behavior consistent with someone expecting an increase in
earnings, such as taking title to a new luxury car.
Using computer models to predict incomes has already been a reality for
nearly a decade. Experian PLC, one of the credit-reporting agencies, introduced a
service in 2011 called Income Insight that predicts an individual’s income, based
solely on credit-report data, without even seeing the individual’s tax returns. 113
Artificial intelligence drawing from even more data, including complete tax
histories, credit reports, vehicle registrations, and various other government
records, could predict next year’s income still more accurately. AI could predict
not only future income, but also the probability of a substantial jump in income,
like the one C expected in the example above. Private intermediaries would have a
strong incentive to obtain relevant data from taxpayers and train their AI models
properly to identify such taxpayers—and not offer them the alternative regime.
This example demonstrates an important point: the AI used by private
intermediaries need not be perfect for contractual tax reform to make society betteroff. When taxpayers like A opt into an alternative regime, then the economic “pie”
gets bigger: A ends up with higher utility, and the government ends up with more
tax revenue than otherwise ($5,000 in the example above). If a taxpayer like C is
accidentally allowed to opt into the alternative regime, the economic pie does not
get smaller. Rather, a slice of the pie ($3,000 in the example above) is transferred
to C, who pays less in taxes.114 The increased tax collections from A more than
offset the lost tax from C, while both A and C are left better off.
112

Recall that we assumed that current law imposed a 10% rate on the first $50,000 of income and then 40%
on all income above $50,000; under that schedule, $120,000 in income would result in $33,000 in taxes. But
under the alternative regime all income would be taxed at 25%; $125,000 in income would result in just $30,000
in taxes.
113
Scott Thurm, Data Mining Your Mind — The Next Frontier Is Predicting Personal Behavior; The ‘Ability
to Pay’ Index, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2011, at B1.
114
Indeed, suppose that the alternative tax regime in the example were offered to A, B, and C. Of these, B
would not opt in because of the “kinked” indifference curves discussed above. But A and C would both opt in,
with the government gaining $5,000 in additional taxes from A and losing $3,000 by giving a tax windfall to
C. The government comes out overall with $2,000 in additional tax revenues.
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Private intermediaries might use a number of other creative strategies to
prevent opportunistic taxpayer behavior like C’s above. For example, some jobs
produce reliable metrics of effort, such as factory workers’ hours clocked or lawfirm lawyers’ hours billed.115 For taxpayers with such jobs, the alternative tax
regime might provide the lower marginal rates only if the taxpayer demonstrates an
increase in hours worked. This example highlights a broader point: the current onesize-fits-all approach to tax law is constrained by the feasibility of obtaining
information, whereas contractual tax reform allows alternative tax regimes to be
available only to taxpayers for whom relevant information is available. For such
taxpayers, an alternative tax regime can create a win-win for both the taxpayers and
the government.
C. Reducing Waste
1. Saving on Compliance Costs
The current tax system has staggeringly large compliance costs: not only
amounts paid directly to tax preparers and tax software providers, but also
taxpayers’ time. Although estimates vary based on methodologies, complying with
the tax code likely costs the U.S. economy between $150 billion and $250 billion
per year.116 Although contractual tax reform will itself entail some transaction costs
– as do all contracts – alternative tax regimes could simplify the tax code and reduce
total compliance costs. Scholars and policymakers have proposed many ways to
make tax compliance less costly.117 But uncertainty, inertia, gridlock, and special
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Optimal tax literature generally assumes that the government cannot directly observe taxpayers’ effort. See,
e.g., Mankiw et al., supra note 92, at 150 (“The planner can observe income, which depends on both ability
and effort, but the planner can observe neither ability nor effort directly.”). Recall that the economics literature
uses the term “ability” where we have been using the term “earnings potential.” Although true for many
professions, this assumption may not be quite accurate for those taxpayers whose hours are clocked.
116

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-878, SUMMARY OF ESTIMATES OF THE COSTS OF THE
FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM (Aug. 26, 2005), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-878 (estimating 2005
compliance costs of $107 billion, likely lower than current costs due to inflation and increased tax-code
complexity); DEMIAN BRADY, NATIONAL TAXPAYERS UNION FOUNDATION, TAX COMPLEXITY 2016 (Apr. 6,
2016), http://www.ntu.org/foundation/detail/tax-complexity-2016-the-increasing-compliance-burdens-of-thetax-code (estimating current compliance costs at $234.4 billion); JASON J. FICHTNER & JACOB M. FELDMAN,
THE
HIDDEN
COSTS
OF
TAX
COMPLIANCE
(2013),
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Fichtner_TaxCompliance_v3.pdf (using broader definition of costs and
reaching U.S. estimates ranging between $215 billion and $987 billion).
117
See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, Some Income Tax Simplification Proposals, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 71 (2013)
(providing several dozen proposals); William G. Gale, Fixing the Tax System: Support Fairer Simpler, and
More Adequate Taxation (Brookings Institution Opportunity 08 Paper, Feb. 28, 2007),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/PB_TaxPolicy_Gale.pdf.
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interests have prevented implementation.118 Contractual tax reform could bypass
this inertia and unlock savings from tax simplification by allowing taxpayers to opt
into alternative tax regimes—many likely based on preexisting work by tax
scholars—that simplify compliance.
For example, a bewildering array of tax provisions govern retirement
savings, creating compliance burdens for taxpayers, their employers, and financial
institutions handling retirement accounts.119 These provisions could be greatly
simplified.120 Similarly, taxpayers currently must calculate their tax liability twice,
once using the normal rules, and again using the different rules of the alternative
minimum tax.121 An alternative tax regime could provide a single robust set of rules
and a single set of rates, requiring calculating liability only once.
2. Closing the “Tax Gap”
The IRS currently collects only approximately 84% of taxes due.122 The
uncollected 16%, about $400 billion per year,123 is the “tax gap.”124 The largest
component of the tax gap is underreporting of gross income by individuals or selfemployed business owners.125 Taxpayers who receive wages or salaries have an
118

See James C. Gould, Tax Reform, Congress, and Politics, 146 TAX NOTES 983 (Feb. 23, 2015) (“[T]he
highly visible base-broadening side of a major tax reform bill has the capacity to anger interest groups
representing nearly every part of the population and every region of the country . . . .”); Joseph Bankman, Using
Technology to Simplify Individual Tax Filing, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 773 (2008) (noting that Intuit and other returnpreparers have fought tax simplification moves); Farhad Manjoo, Would You Let the I.R.S. Prepare Your
Taxes?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2015, at B11 (same).
119
Dodge, supra note 117, at 123–34.
120

Id. There is bipartisan support for simplifying the mishmash of tax rules governing retirement. See Zachary
Abate, Legislative Outlook: Hearings on Tax Returns, Retirement Security Planned, 2019 TAX NOTES TODAY
23-9 (Feb. 4, 2019) (noting that the new Democratic chair of the House Ways and Means Committee plans to
reintroduce the Retirement Plan Simplification and Enhancement Act of 2017 in the new Congress).
121
I.R.C. §§ 55-59 (imposing alternative minimum tax (AMT) and mandating differences in calculation). See
generally LISA MARIE STARCZEWSKI, PORTFOLIO 587: NONCORPORATE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX (3d ed.
2019) (giving overview of AMT as applied to individuals and other noncorporate taxpayers).
122

IRS, TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2008-2010, at 1 (Apr. 2016), reprinted in 2016 TAX NOTES
TODAY 83-30. These are the latest years for which data are available given the length of time required to audit
taxpayers and resolve disputes. See also William Hoffman, Tax Gap Widens, Compliance Rate Falls; Wyden
Calls for Crackdown, 151 TAX NOTES 586 (May 2, 2016) (discussing this IRS tax-gap estimates release).
123
IRS, supra note 122, at 1 (estimating the net tax gap, which is the gap never ultimately collected even after
IRS enforcement actions, as $406 billion).
124
Id. (discussing definition).
125

There are three basic components of the tax gap: (1) taxpayers who do not file tax returns as required; (2)
underreporting of tax liability on filed returns; and (3) taxpayers who underpay the liabilities shown on their
returns. IRS, supra note 122, att. 1. Category (2) is far and away the largest, and it has two large subcomponents
that correspond directly to underreporting by individuals who own businesses and/or are self-employed:
$125 billion in individuals underreporting the income tax due on their business income, and $65 billion by self-
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extraordinarily high level of compliance,126 because their employers are required to
send a W-2 listing their gross income to the IRS,127 which cross-checks the W-2
against the tax return by matching the Social Security Number. By contrast,
business owners and the self-employed are generally not subject to information
reporting like the W-2, and their underreporting is the largest component of the tax
gap.128 Increased information reporting requirements on business owners and the
self-employed are widely recognized as central to reducing the tax gap.129
Contractual tax reform could help close the tax gap in two ways. First,
private intermediaries would have an incentive to offer low-compliance-group
taxpayers alternative tax regimes that arrange for stringent information reporting,
in exchange for lower tax rates. For example, an alternative tax regime offered to a
shopkeeper could involve both the cash register and the credit-card reader reporting
all transactions to the private intermediary via the internet—potentially reinforced
by having a videocamera recording all activity in the store to ensure that no cash is
paid “under the counter.” In exchange, the shopkeeper could receive lower rates or
some other benefit such as a simplified tax system. Research shows that many
taxpayers who underreport their taxes would like to be in full compliance but do
not comply because they feel that their competitors do not comply.130 Such
taxpayers might happily opt into an alternative tax regime with higher monitoring,
but lower tax rates.
Second, contractual tax reform could allow the IRS to focus its limited
enforcement resources on taxpayers least likely to be compliant: those to whom
private intermediaries offered alternative regimes involving more monitoring, but

employed individuals underreporting the Social Security and Medicare taxes due on their income. Id.
126
Id. at 2 (“income . . . subject to substantial information reporting and withholding” which includes wages
and salaries results in only 1% of the total underreporting for Individual Income Taxes).
127

I.R.C. § 6041; id. § 6051; Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-2(a). The requirement to file W-2s is backed up by fines
and up to one year in jail time. I.R.C. § 6674; id. § 7204.
128
IRS, supra note 122, att. 3 (“Income subject to little or no information reporting,” which “includes nonfarm
proprietor income, other income, rents and royalties, farm income, Form 4797 income,” results in 63% of total
underreporting for Individual Income Taxes); accord GENE L. DODARO, GAO-16-92T, COMPTROLLER
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, BEFORE THE SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE (Oct. 1, 2015) (“Where there is
little or no information reporting, such as with business income, taxpayers tend to significantly misreport their
income.”).
129
DODARO, supra note 128, at 35; DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE
ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2017 REVENUE PROPOSALS 198–201 (Feb. 2016) (proposing two informationreporting requirement reforms to reduce the tax gap).
130

Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J.
1453, 1504–06 (2003); Susan Cleary Morse, Joseph Bankman & Stewart Karlinsky, Cash Businesses and Tax
Evasion, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 37 (2009); cf. Christopher Bergin, CID to Employment Tax Evaders: ‘We
Will Catch You’, 91 TAX NOTES 1220 (2001) (“[S]ome employers turn to evading taxes to stay competitive in
their industry.”).
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who declined to opt in.131 Merely offering the alternative regime causes taxpayers
to reveal information about themselves, and this information could be used to better
focus audit resources.132 This benefit stands in stark contrast to most of the benefits
we have already discussed, which are Pareto-efficient, leaving the government,
each taxpayer, and the private intermediary no worse off than before (and often
better off). Allowing the IRS to focus enforcement resources on taxpayers who
decline to opt into alternative regimes involving more substantiation will be worse
off. But this detriment to low-compliance taxpayers will likely benefit society as a
whole by increasing compliance rates.
D. Opening the Overton Window
As these examples suggest, private intermediaries might embrace ideas that
are well beyond the range of political plausibility, that are outside the “Overton
window” of acceptable political discourse.133 Private intermediaries could offer
alternative tax regimes that are radically different from the current system. The
progressive economist Dean Baker has argued that instead of taxing corporations
based on their pre-tax profits,134 the government should become minority
shareholders in corporate enterprises.135 Under this proposal, the government would
receive nonvoting shares in an amount designed to provide the same revenues as
the corporate tax, and the corporation would then be entirely free from paying
corporate taxes. The corporation would no longer have an incentive to hire legions
of well-paid tax advisors to take economically distortionary steps to minimize
taxes.136
This proposal is not a radical departure economically, as the government is
effectively already a passive minority shareholder in every entity that pays taxes.137
131

Economists have developed many sorting mechanisms to discover this taxpayer information, with the goal
of optimizing tax law enforcement. E.g., Parkash Chander & Louis L. Wilde, A General Characterization of
Optimal Income Tax Enforcement, 65 REV. ECON. STUD. 165 (1998). Yet none of these mechanisms has the
simplicity of the opt-in of contractual tax reform.
132
Cf. Raskolnikov, supra note 6 (proposing requiring taxpayers to choose between higher penalties or a more
cooperative enforcement regime including binding arbitration).
133
See generally Joseph Lehman, A Brief Explanation of the Overton Window, MACKINAC CTR. FOR PUBLIC
POL’Y (n.d.) (last visited Jan. 31, 2019) (describing Joseph Overton’s theory that current legal change depends
on what is considered plausible, but that this might change over time).
134
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 11(a) (imposing a 21% tax).
135
Dean Baker, Get Rid of Corporate Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2016, at A21 (noting that such a proposal
has “been a popular ‘what if’ among academic economists for years” but had not been brought “into the light
of policy discussions”). For discussion of how the government might itself experiment with such a reform
without the help of private tax providers, see Abramowicz, supra note 47, at 29-31.
136
Id.
137

See

Mihir A. Desai et al., Theft and Taxes, 84 J. FIN. ECON. 591, 592 (2007) (“The state, thanks to its tax
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But it would be a radical departure institutionally and legally. If this reform were
implemented in generally applicable law, it would run into legal obstacles like the
Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.138 Moreover, implementing this reform for all
corporations at once would be risky, because it might not produce as much tax
revenue in the short-term as the current corporate tax system.139 This reform,
however, could be offered as an alternative tax regime. If it indeed offers substantial
efficiency gains, then it would offer substantial benefits to taxpayers (here,
corporations), the government (through higher revenue), and private intermediaries
that offer it.140 At the same time, it might change the public conception of what is
possible in the tax system, either opening the Overton window when private
regimes prove attractive or closing it decisively should they fail.
Other reform proposals outside the current Overton window could be
offered as alternative tax regimes. For example, corporations might be offered
lower corporate rates, in exchange for losing the deduction for interest paid on
debt.141 As another example, publicly traded securities held by individuals for
investment could be marked-to-market, meaning that taxpayers would recognize
gains and losses each year even if they do not sell the securities.142 In exchange for
marking-to-market, taxpayers might get a lower rate for gains when their securities
increase in value. Contractual tax reform allows experimentation with a nearly

claim on cash flows, is de facto the largest minority shareholder in almost all corporations.”).
138
U.S. CONST. amend. V; Starr Intern. Co. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 50, 72–75 (2012) (holding that
forcing company to issue preferred stock was cognizable under the Takings Clause); cf. Swisher Int’l, Inc. v.
Schafer, 550 F.3d 1046, 1055 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding that Takings Clause did not apply to a regulatory
scheme); Adams v. United States, 391 F.3d 1212, 1224–25 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (finding a depositor in a bank
account protected under the Takings Clause).
139

Corporations might react by avoiding paying dividends, with the corporation retaining cash, thus benefitting
shareholders as the value of the stock went up. The non-government shareholders could thus reap the benefits
of the corporation’s profits by selling their shares for the higher prices. But the share-price increase would not
result in any cash flow to the government. If the corporation attempted to return cash to shareholders by
redeeming shares (i.e., a buy-back), then a pro-rata portion of the government’s shares would have to be
redeemed as well, resulting in cash flow.
140

As with the individual income tax, tax expenditures are a complication. See supra notes 22–31
and accompanying text. Congress would need to find some other means of ensuring that target
taxpayers fulfill the goals embodied by corporate tax expenditures. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 199 (providing
a deduction for qualified domestic production activities).
141

I.R.C. § 163(a); see, e.g., JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, FEDERAL INCOME TAX ASPECTS OF CORPORATE
FINANCIAL STRUCTURES (Jan. 18, 1989), reprinted in 89 TAX NOTES TODAY 17-1. The tax-reform bill passed
in December 2017, Pub. L. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054, placed some caps on the deductibility of business interest.
I.R.C. § 163(j); H.R. Rep. 115–466 (Conf. Report), Dec, 15, 2017, at 385-92 (discussing limitations).
142
See the numerous authorities cited supra note 44, proposing varieties of mark-to-market combined with
different rates applying. Currently mark-to-market is normally available solely for securities dealers like stock
brokerages. I.R.C. § 475; cf. id. § 1256 (providing mark-to-market on sophisticated financial instruments like
futures contracts and foreign currency contracts).

CONTRACTUAL TAX REFORM

34

endless variety of possible alternative tax regimes, and it provides private
intermediaries with incentives to develop alternatives not previously considered.
II. IMPLEMENTATION

The previous Part suggested some possible alternative tax regimes that
private intermediaries might offer. These were hypothetical examples; the private
intermediaries themselves would take the initiative in designing alternative tax
regimes and deciding which taxpayers to invite to opt in. Contractual tax reform is
voluntary; private intermediaries decide what alternative regime to offer and to
whom, and invited taxpayers decide whether to opt in. It thus does not amount to
privatization in any conventional sense. Privatization may enable government
agencies to circumvent the legislative process to accomplish idiosyncratic policy
goals,143 but contractual tax reform does not give government officials discretion.
And while critics argue that privatization is based on a myth “that markets are more
efficient than government,”144 our proposal is agnostic about in what areas and for
which taxpayers, private intermediaries may be able to improve existing law. If
private intermediaries cannot provide an alternative tax regime that leaves both
taxpayers and the government’s coffers better off, tax law and institutions will
simply continue to function as before.
A. Basic Mechanics: Treatment Group and Control Group
A private intermediary—say, “Taxes, Inc.”—would both design the
alternative tax regime and solicit taxpayers to opt in to the alternative regime. Some
invited taxpayers would simply decline to opt in. Others might be refused entry by
the intermediary based on further data analysis.145 Of the taxpayers who remain,
most (say, 90%) would in fact be subject to the alternative tax regime.146 These
taxpayers are the “treatment group,” with their tax treatment specified in the
alternative tax regime.

143
144
145

See Jon D. Michaels, Privitization’s Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717 (2010).
Matthew Titolo, Privatization and the Market Frame, 60 BUFFALO L. REV. 493, 494 (2012).

Taxes, Inc. would receive taxpayer information only if taxpayers gave their consent. Taxpayers’ return data
is kept confidential. I.R.C. § 6103; see BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 35, ¶ 111.4 (discussing § 6103 in depth).
Taxpayers might grant permission either for specific intermediaries or for all intermediaries to consider their
information. Even with permission, private tax intermediaries would need to be bound by the penalties against
unauthorized disclosure or misuse of return information. See I.R.C. § 7213 (criminal penalty); id. § 7213A
(same); id. § 7431 (civil actions).
146
Because the profits to the intermediaries depend on the control group, the percentage must be sufficiently
high to ensure comparisons to the control group are sufficiently reliable for whatever level of statistical
significance the government determines is necessary.
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Some percentage (say, 10%) of taxpayers who are invited and who opt in
would randomly be assigned to serve as the “control group,” subject to generally
applicable tax law, filing their returns with the IRS. Taxes, Inc., would be required
to ensure that the government received tax revenues from the treatment group based
on the taxes collected from those in the control group. Given the percentages in our
example, Taxes, Inc., could be required to pay the government 9.0 times the taxes
paid by the control group,147 ensuring revenue neutrality for the government.
Alternatively, Taxes, Inc. could be required to pay the government 9.0 times the
taxes paid by the control group, plus some percentage, set by formula, of any excess
collected from the treatment group. This arrangement would make contractual tax
reform a potential revenue-raiser for the government, helping to reduce deficits or
to fund new social spending.
B. The Role of Intermediaries
The role of the private tax intermediary is similar to an insurance company
in two fundamental ways: designing a legal instrument and deciding to whom to
offer it. Insurers design insurance policies for a risk pool and then decide who is
eligible to buy into that risk pool. Similarly, private tax intermediaries would design
alternative tax regimes and decide who is eligible to opt into the alternative tax
regime. Insurers aim to collect more in premiums than they pay out on policies.
Private tax intermediaries would aim to collect more in taxes from the treatment
group than the control group’s taxes suggests the treatment group would have paid.
Both insurers and private tax intermediaries must worry about adverse selection.148
In this context, adverse selection represents the possibility that those opting in are
in fact those who would pay lower taxes to the private provider than to the
government. Private intermediaries would use data and AI, plus careful design of
the alternative tax regime, to combat such adverse selection.
This Section explores the private intermediaries in more detail. Part II.B.1
addresses which tasks the intermediary would take and which tasks would remain
the responsibility of the tax authority. Part II.B.2 explores the organizational form
of tax intermediaries, noting that they might be for-profit or nonprofit cooperatives,
and Part II.B.3 examines the duration of the intermediary and of its contract with
147

The private intermediary’s required payment might be adjusted by various administrative expenses that it
either imposes on the IRS or relieves the IRS of. For example, if the intermediary handled auditing and dispute
resolution, that would save the IRS the cost of auditing treatment-group taxpayers and resolving disputes that
arose; thus, Taxes, Inc.’s required payment might be reduced below 9.0 to account for these savings to the U.S.
Treasury.
148
See Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An

Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629 (1976) (providing a theoretical
model of adverse selection in insurance markets).
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the insured. Finally, Part II.B.4 explains different strategies that the government
might use to ensure that the intermediaries will in fact be able to pay their tax bills,
as calculated from the tax bills of the control group.
1. Division of Responsibility
Contractual tax reform can work with either the existing tax authority (i.e.,
the IRS) or the private intermediary handling administration.149 With IRS
administration, the private intermediary might design the alternative tax regime, but
all taxpayers in the treatment group would still file an annual tax return with the
IRS. The return would include a tax form identifying the intermediary and the
alternative tax regime. The IRS would continue to handle return processing,
auditing, and collection activities.150 Alternatively, the private intermediary might
handle administration, replacing the treatment-group taxpayers’ need to file tax
returns with the IRS. The taxpayers might file a return designed by the private
intermediary, with the private intermediary – or potentially even no return at all.151
In other words, alternative tax regimes could offer different procedural law.
With private administration, substantive tax law might even be unchanged.
This highlights that contractual tax reform can be used to improve tax procedure as
well as tax substance. IRS tax administration currently suffers from two interrelated
failures. First, the IRS is large,152 cumbersome, and slow, failing to take full

149

See generally MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN & LESLIE BOOK, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2d ed. 2002 & Supp.
2016-3) (providing full overview of tax enforcement, ranging from return-filing, to auditing, to appeals, to
collection of tax debts).
150
An issue arises as to whether the private intermediary’s liability should depend on the total collected from
the control and treatment groups (i.e., tax bills actually collected) or the total assessed against the control and
treatment groups (i.e., the tax bills reported). The distinction is that not all taxpayers pay their full assessed tax
bill. IRS, supra note 122, at 3 (noting the underpayment tax gap of $39 billion). Basing the private
intermediary’s liability solely on collections might give the IRS the perverse incentive not to try collecting
from treatment taxpayers, since the intermediary serves as a backstop. On the other hand, it may be easier to
collect from such taxpayers, since liability would not be in dispute. If the IRS cannot be trusted to be even
handed, then liability should be based on assessments. But very little of the “tax gap” is the result of the IRS’s
failure to collect. Id. at 3 (reporting the “Underpayment Tax Gap” as just $39 billion, which is far less than the
total “gross tax gap” of $458 billion). Indeed, the IRS is already quite good at collecting assessed but un-paid
taxes, plus penalties and interest. Id. (showing “Enforced & Other Late Payments” as $52 billion).
151

See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, 100 MILLION UNNECESSARY RETURNS: A SIMPLE, FAIR, AND COMPETITIVE
TAX PLAN FOR THE UNITED STATES (2008) (proposing tax reforms that would largely eliminate tax filing for
many U.S. individuals).
152
See IRS, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK 2014 69 tbl.30 (listing 82,406 average full-time
permanent employees during fiscal year 2014).
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advantage of new technology.153 Second, Congress has underfunded the IRS,154 with
each additional $1 spent on enforcement and administration resulting in at least $5
in additional revenue collected.155 Private tax intermediaries would be able to raise
private capital to improve collections and to improve technology systems, outside
the constraints of congressional budgeting that hamper the IRS.156 Given a more
efficient collection process that induces greater compliance, intermediaries might
be able to offer participating taxpayers a small discount on their total liability.
Even if an alternative tax regime used the private intermediary as
administrator in lieu of the IRS, it would not free taxpayers from possible criminal
liability. Fraud against private intermediaries would still be criminal tax fraud.157
Like insurers constantly seeking to ferret out insurance fraud,158 private tax
intermediaries would have incentives to investigate such conduct and refer it to
prosecutors.
2. Organizational Form
Some of the largest insurance companies in the U.S. are mutual insurance
companies, acting as cooperatives, owned by their customers, and returning profits

153

See Written Testimony of Terence Milholland, Chief Technology Officer, IRS, before the House Oversight
and Government Reform Committee (May 25, 2016), available at 2016 TAX NOTES TODAY 102-31 (discussing
at length the IRS’s legacy technology systems, many of which were “initially developed over 50 years ago,”
and which use were effectively designed to “automate[] the processing of paper returns”).
154

See John Koskinen, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Prepared Remarks Before the AICPA (Nov. 3,
2015), https://www.irs.gov/uac/prepared-remarks-of-commissioner-koskinen-before-the-aicpa.
155
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE: FY 2017 PRESIDENT’S BUDGET, at IRS-17 (Feb.
9,
2016),
https://www.treasury.gov/about/budget-performance/CJ17/0206.%20IRS%20FY%202017%20CJ%201%2022%2016%20v2%20FINAL%20CLEAN.PDF ($5.60 per $1
spent is the average ROI; noting that some projects would be expected to achieve much higher ROIs, such as
$12.30 per $1 spent).
156

Many variations of alternative tax regimes with procedural changes are possible. For example,
the private intermediary might give taxpayers who agree to a more rigorous collection process a
slight discount on their returns in exchange.
157

See I.R.C. § 7201 (making “willfully attempt[ing] in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this
title or the payment thereof” a felony). See generally BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 35, ¶ 114.9 (discussing
tax fraud and other tax crimes, of which § 7201 is the “capstone” section) (quoting Spies v. United States, 317
U.S. 492, 497 (1943)). Assuming that the authority for contractual tax reform was provided in the Internal
Revenue Code, which is “this title” referred to in § 7201, then there need not even be any statutory amendment
for § 7201 to apply to fraud against private tax intermediaries.
158
See 13 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 197:8 (noting incentives for insurers, as well as trend for insurers to develop
Special Investigative Units to attack insurance fraud); see also MODEL INSURANCE FRAUD ACT §§ 9 & 10
(allowing for cooperation and exchange of information about insurance fraud between insurers and law
enforcement).
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to them.159 Other insurers are for-profit, with profits going to shareholders. One
might expect to see both models appear for private tax intermediaries.
For-profit tax intermediaries would attempt to attract taxpayers to opt into
their alternative tax regimes by designing them to be utility-enhancing for the
taxpayers who opt-in. To the extent that treatment-group taxpayers pay higher taxes
than control-group taxpayers, the intermediary will earn gross profit. Subtracting
out the costs of designing and administering the regime, plus any percentage that
the government might demand to make the program a revenue-raiser, would result
in profits for shareholders.
Cooperative tax intermediaries would, by contrast, be akin to mutual
insurers. Mutual insurers offer insurance products generally comparable to those
offered by for-profit insurers, sweetened by the possibility of a profit rebate.
Cooperative tax intermediaries would offer alternative tax regimes, sweetened with
the possibility of a tax rebate to treatment-group taxpayers.160 For example, if a
cooperative tax intermediary offered an alternative tax regime where the treatmentgroup taxpayers generated 105% of the taxpayers in the control group. Cooperative
intermediary would refund treatment-group taxpayers 5% of their taxes paid.161
Currently no private tax intermediaries exist—either for-profit or
cooperative. Where would these entities come from? Some for-profit intermediaries
would likely be similar to the current crop of “Fintech” (financial technology) firms
that are reshaping finance – including insurance – by taking advantage of artificial
intelligence, the lower transaction costs allowed by technology, and alternative
funding methods.162 Companies like H&R Block, Intuit (the maker of TurboTax),
and Jackson Hewitt Tax Service, Inc., which already have a strong presence in tax
preparation, might also consider becoming private tax intermediaries. Indeed, these
existing players have long strived to offer tax-related financial services to their
159

Examples of mutual insurance companies include State Farm, New York Life, and USAA.
The formulas for the cooperative for dividing refunds amongst treatment-group taxpayers would be one
aspect of the alternative tax regime that the regime would need to specify. One formula would be to rebate the
cooperative’s surplus in proportion to the actual tax revenue paid by the taxpayer. Another formula would be
to rebate the surplus in proportion to the amount by which the actual tax revenue paid by the taxpayer exceeded
what that taxpayer would have paid under the generally applicable tax code. Any number of other formulas are
possible to meet the goals of the cooperative. For example, the dairy cooperative Land O’Lakes has six different
rebate rates for different fertilizer types it sells to its members. HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF
ENTERPRISE 152 (2000); cf. Andrew Blair-Stanek, Explaining the Enigmatic Expulsion in Northwest Wholesale
Stationers v. Pacific Stationery & Printing, 53 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 335, 378-80 (2018) (describing historical
example of conflict within a cooperative caused by rebate formulas).
160
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The precise number would, of course, adjusted for the intermediaries’ costs of administration, any share
that the government demanded, and any rebates from the government for savings in terms of IRS audit, dispute,
and administration costs.
162
See, e.g., Special Report: International Banking—From the People, for the People, ECONOMIST, May 9,
2015.
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customers,163 so they might jump at the opportunity to become private tax
intermediaries.
Industry groups might set up cooperative tax intermediaries to offer
alternative tax regimes that address inefficiencies in the tax code. For example,
plumbers might find a particular substantiation requirement of the tax code too
costly in comparison to the additional tax revenues it raises for the government.
The Plumbing Contractors of America might offer its members an alternative tax
regime that removes this substantiation requirement, perhaps along with a handful
of other changes, in exchange for a slightly higher tax rate. Politically active groups
or non-profits might set up cooperative tax intermediaries to promote behavior seen
as virtuous. For example, environmentalist groups might offer an alternative tax
regime that taxed carbon, in exchange for lower income-tax rates.164 We would not,
however, allow employers to serve as intermediaries for their own employees,
because of the danger of conflicts of interest.165
3. Duration
The tax year might serve as a natural duration for an agreement between a
taxpayer and a private intermediary. Limiting duration is especially important with
initial experiments with contractual reform, just as contractual tax reform should
be limited in scope initially to ensure that it is capable of producing benefits.166 In
principle, however, there could be benefits to longer duration. First, intermediaries
might wish to enable trade-offs over time, for example by giving greater tax
discounts for education or job training activities that the intermediaries judge to be
likely to be successful in generating income, in exchange for higher tax rates once
the training is complete. In this sense, contractual tax reform can serve as a modest
version of “income share agreements,” an alternative to student loans in which
students promise to repay a portion of their future income.167
163

For example, tax preparers offer various financial products giving customers access to their refunds. See
William Hoffman, Practitioners Hope for the Best as CADE 2 Implementation Begins, 134 TAX NOTES 302
(Jan. 16, 2012) (discussing the decline of “refund anticipation loans” offered by many tax preparers and the
corresponding shift of the tax-preparation industry to “prepaid refund debit cards and other financial products”)
164

See Ian Ayres, Voluntary Taxation and Beyond: The Promise of Social-Contracting Voting Mechanisms
(Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 562) (2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2820299.
165

One type of conflict is that an employer might seek to game the system by reducing the earnings
of employees randomly assigned to the control group, thus reducing the employer’s own tax
liability. This may be unlikely, but there is little benefit to tying tax contracts to the employment
relationship.
166
See infra Part II.C.1.
167
See generally Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Human Equity? Regulating the New Income Share
Agreements, 68 VANDERBILT L. REV. 681 (2015) (offering a multifactorial framework for regulating
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Second, long durations may be useful as a way of countering a potential
strategy in which taxpayers shift income into the contract period and out of other
periods.168 Regardless of the duration of the contract, the government must ensure
that the intermediaries’ profit or liability depends on all future tax payments by
treatment and control group taxpayers. Suppose, for example, that an intermediary
offers an unusually attractive capital gains rate, leading taxpayers to recognize
capital gains during that period.169 That might lead to higher tax payments in that
year but lower tax payments later. Thus, when the treatment group taxpayers pay
less in tax years following the initial contract, the intermediary would be
responsible for the difference. On the flip side, the intermediaries would be paid if
their contract led to greater income recognized later. These dangers will cause
intermediaries to be careful in designing their tax regimes in a way that prevents
taxpayers from exploiting timing rules to their disadvantage; for example, they
might agree to limit capital gains recognition (perhaps to zero) during the contract.
Still, longer-term arrangements might reduce this danger and thus be more
attractive to both taxpayers and private intermediaries.
4. Solvency Assurance
The potential for long-term liabilities for private intermediaries strengthens
the need to ensure that they will be sufficiently solvent to meet them. Suppose
Taxes, Inc. offered a disastrous alternative tax regime that resulted in treatmentgroup taxpayers generating tax revenues at a rate of only 80% of control-group
taxpayers. Taxes, Inc. would be required to reimburse some or all of the remaining
20% to the government. But Taxes, Inc. might have insufficient assets to reimburse
the government, resulting in insolvency. Avoiding this situation is crucial for
contractual tax reform to be viable, since, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly
observed, “taxes are the life-blood of government, and their prompt and certain
availability an imperious need.”170 If treatment-group taxpayers produce more
revenue than control-group taxpayers, the intermediary’s shareholders or
cooperative members keep some or all of the extra. But if treatment-group
taxpayers produce less revenue, the intermediary might simply become insolvent,

such agreements).
168
This danger also exists with governmental experimentation in taxation. See Abramowicz, supra
note 47, at 44-46.
169
In general, “any item of gross income shall be included in the gross income for the taxable year
in which received by the taxpayer.” I.R.C. § 451.
170

United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 732 (1985) (quoting Bull v. United States, 295
U.S. 247, 259 (1935)).
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leaving the government with less tax revenue than generally applicable tax law. The
result might be “heads the intermediary wins, tails the government loses.”171
Insurance and banking both provide similar risks of insolvency. Insurance
regulation and banking regulation both provide several possible solutions that could
work for regulating private tax intermediaries. These solutions include capital
requirements, bonding, and caveat emptor.
Capital requirements ensure the solvency of FDIC-insured banks172 and of
insurers.173 Banks are required to have sufficient capital—consisting of equity and
debt that subordinated to bank depositors—to ensure sufficient assets are available
to repay depositors in full.174 This “capital cushion” generally needs to be larger
when the bank is taking greater risks, and smaller when the bank is taking smaller
risks.175 Similarly, private tax intermediaries could be required to have sufficient
capital—consisting of equity and debt subordinated to tax revenue owed to the
government—to ensure sufficient assets to pay the government. The greater the
riskiness of the alternative tax regime, the more capital the intermediary would have
to hold on its balance sheet.
Bonding is the second model for addressing the risk of intermediary
insolvency. When governments enter into contracts with private companies to build
public buildings or public works, statutes require that the private companies furnish
bonds to ensure that the building is built and that all suppliers, workers, and
subcontractors are paid.176 A third party acts as a surety on such bonds,177 ensuring
performance and full payment if the contractor becomes insolvent. 178 Because the
171

Similar situations appear throughout the law. For example, equityholders in a corporation with little equity
will be tempted to take large risks, since they reap the upsides but the corporation’s creditors bear the
downsides. See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Comm’n Corp., 1991 WL 277613 at n.55 (Del.
Ch. 1981). Similarly, before their insolvency, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were private for-profit corporations
operating with a de facto government guarantee, leading them to take large risks. See Carol J. Perry, Note,
Rethinking Fannie and Freddie’s New Insolvency Regime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1752 (2009).
172

MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANKING LAW & REGULATION § 7.03 (2d ed. 2017-1 supp.); see also Mehrsa
Baradaran, Regulation by Hypothetical, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1247, 1265–72 (2014) (overview of existing regime
of bank capital requirements).
173
1 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 2:27 (discussing capital-reserve regulation of insurers); 3 id. § 39:4 (2017 rev.)
(“Typically, the commissioner of insurance may require that a certain portion of the capital remain unimpaired
in order to safely satisfy potential claims”).
174
Malloy, supra note 172, § 7.03[C][4][b].
175

Id.
See, e.g., 40 U.S.C. § 3131. See generally 17 AM. JUR. 2d Contractors’ Bonds § 25 (2017 rev.).
177
See, e.g., United States for Benefit and on Behalf of Sherman v. Carter, 353 U.S. 210 (1957) (involving
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company as surety); Alice Zelikson, What Is a Construction Surety Bond?,
GEN RE (Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.genre.com/knowledge/blog/what-is-a-construction-surety-bond.html (“a
surety company is typically part of an insurance company”).
178
See 74 AM. JUR. 2D Suretyship § 1 (2017 rev.) (“A suretyship is a three-party relationship where the surety
[e.g., the insurance company] undertakes to perform to an obligee [e.g., the government] if the principal [e.g.,
176
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surety will be on the hook if the contractor defaults, the surety has a strong incentive
to scrutinize the risk that the contractor will fail to complete the project, and thus
to charge an appropriate premium. Similarly, insurance regulators often allow
insurance companies to post a bond to guard against the insurer becoming insolvent
and unable to satisfy policyholders’ claims.179 Private tax intermediaries could be
required to furnish bonds to ensure that the government is paid.
Caveat emptor is the third model for addressing the risk of intermediary
insolvency. Banking regulation uses this approach for wealthy depositors; FDIC
insurance covers only the first $250,000 in deposits.180 Any deposits above
$250,000 can be fully or partially lost if the bank becomes insolvent. Insurance
regulation sometimes also uses this approach, as policyholders may receive less
than the full amount owed them by an insurer that becomes insolvent.181 Applying
this caveat emptor model to private tax intermediaries, if an intermediary becomes
insolvent, then all taxpayers in in the treatment group would be required to pay their
ordinary tax obligation to the government under the generally applicable tax laws.
This approach creates incentives for taxpayers to evaluate and monitor the financial
condition of their tax intermediary. Meanwhile, a tax intermediary could reduce the
risk of insolvency by providing in the alternative tax regime’s definition that if tax
receipts fall short, all treatment group taxpayers must pay an additional amount
sufficient to cover the amount the intermediary owes to the government. Regardless
of how implemented, caveat emptor would give participating taxpayers incentives
to assess the feasibility of an alternative tax regime before opting into it.
C. Regulation of Contractual Tax Reform
Once assured that the private intermediary is solvent, the government need
not micromanage the contract between intermediary and insured. Nonetheless,
some regulation of contracts may be warranted, especially with early experiments
into contractual tax reform. Part II.C.1 describes limitations that may be
appropriate. Part II.C.2 addresses how regulations should address changes in filing
status, such as marriage. Finally, Part II.C.3 explores how the government might
encourage innovation among private intermediaries.

the private contractor] fails to do so. The surety stands in the shoes of the principal and must complete any
obligation due the obligee at the time of default.”).
179
1 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 2:28.
180

FDIC, Your Insured Deposits, https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/deposits/brochures/your-insured-depositsenglish.pdf.
181
1 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 6:8 (discussing priority of claims upon insurer insolvency, with policyholders
often towards the end of the line, depending on state law).
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1. Limitations
In principle, an alternative tax regime offered by a private tax intermediary
might involve any changes whatsoever to tax law – procedural, substantive, or a
combination of both. But the government would likely prohibit some changes. For
example, to the extent that an alternative tax regime changed procedural law, the
government would require adhering to standards of due process, like those already
present in the tax code.182 As another example, some existing substantive tax
benefits, like the tax credit for research and development, aim to encourage positive
externalities or discourage negative externalities.183 The government might simply
bar alternative tax regimes that remove such tax benefits, so that contractual tax
reform does not reduce social welfare.
The government would likely require intermediaries to file the alternative
tax regime and the eligibility criteria with the government before offering it to
taxpayers. A key design question is whether the government must approve this
alternative regime and eligibility criteria before invitations can go out, or whether
filing alone suffices to allow invitations. There is precedent for both approaches. In
securities law, filing is normally all that is required for many actions.184 But in
insurance law, regulators must approve insurers’ proposed policies,185 and at least
in initial implementation, that approach is likely preferable.
2. Filing Status
Calculating the amount that a private intermediary owes becomes more
challenging when taxpayers may change their filing status.186 In particular, an
individual taxpayer might change his or her tax filing status by marrying or
divorcing, and a business association might merge with another business

182
183
184

See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6320 & 6330.

See discussion supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text

See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77f(c) (“The filing with the Commission of a registration statement, or of an amendment
to a registration statement, shall be deemed to have taken place upon the receipt thereof”); 1 THOMAS LEE
HAZEN, LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1:17 (Nov. 2016 rev). (noting that the Securities Act of 1933 aims
primarily for filing and disclosure, rather than review of merit).
185
1 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 2:8 (Dec. 2016 rev.) (noting that state insurance “commissioners are called upon
to approve policy forms to assure that they are in conformity with all applicable statutes”).
186
This problem can be seen as analogous to the problem of “crossover” in the administration of randomized
experiments. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz et al., Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 929, 959-60 (2012).
For example, if a taxpayer originally in the control group marries a taxpayer in the treatment group, then
subjecting the taxpayer to the treatment regime would amount to changing the taxpayer’s group membership.
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association187 or spin-off a subsidiary.188 Taxpayers might do so opportunistically,
or for reasons having nothing to do with the experiment.
These problems are easily addressed. Any individual or entity outside the
treatment group for the relevant time period (whether in the control group or outside
the experiment altogether) will continue to be subject to independent tax liability if
it combines through marriage or merger with a taxpayer in the treatment group. For
example, if a treatment group individual taxpayer has agreed to pay a lump sum of
$100,000 in taxes,189 someone who marries that person cannot suddenly claim that
the couple must pay a total of just $100,000. Similarly, if a treatment group
company merged with a non-treatment group company, the latter would have to file
separate corporate tax returns.190 Existing tax law already requires separate
corporate tax returns to avoid abuse,191 so this requirement would be easily
implemented.
Changes in control group taxpayers’ status will matter only insofar as they
modestly complicate the government’s calculation of the private intermediary’s
liability. Such taxpayers have no incentive to game the system, since they pay tax
according to the usual rules. So long as the government can develop a reasonable
model allocating tax payment among these taxpayers, this should not be an issue.
For example, such a model would allocate income paid by a newly married couple
between the members of the couple, so if one had been a control group member and
the other were not, the total control group tax payments can be approximated.192 A
divorcing couple poses less of a challenge; just add together their subsequent tax
payments.
Treatment group taxpayers, in contrast, do have an incentive to game the
system, but this is not the government’s problem. The private intermediary would
need to address this in the alternative tax regime. Such solutions could be
straightforward. For example, for a married couple, the alternative tax regime might
simply treat each spouse as a separate taxpayer. This illustrates how contractual tax
reform can accomplish a tax reform goal (eliminating the U.S.’s unusual jointmarried filing status193) without specific legislation on point.
187
188

See I.R.C. § 368(a) (defining how mergers can be tax-free).
See id. §355 (governing tax treatment of corporate separations, such as spin-offs, split-offs, and split-ups).

189

Cf. Section I.B.1 (giving example of alternative regime with lump-sum payment in exchange for low or
zero marginal rates).
190
In many reorganizations, companies maintain their filing statuses in any event. See, e.g., I.R.C. §
368(a)(1)(B) (providing rules for “B” reorganizations).
191

See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 35, ¶ 97.2.
For example, the W-2 wages and salary for each spouse are reported separately with each spouse’s Social
Security Number, and the Schedule C “Profit or Loss from Business” also reports the separate proprietors.
192

193

See, e.g., Edward Fox, Do Taxes Affect Marriage? Lessons from History 9-10 (Law & Econ. Res. Paper
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This example also illustrates another advantage of contractual tax reform
over government-run experimentation.194 If the government ran experimentation, it
would need to worry about exploitation of loopholes by treatment group taxpayers.
The possibility for loopholes certainly does vanish with contractual tax reform, but
intermediaries may be able to respond much more quickly than the government to
problems. If treatment group taxpayers exploit the alternative regime in some
unanticipated way, then the private intermediary can update its alternative tax
regime in the future. That process would be easier and quicker than changing
statutes or regulations. And, unlike Congress and the IRS, private tax intermediaries
would have strong financial incentives to seek out and close loopholes.
3. Innovation Incentives
A potential private tax intermediary faces two risks: that too few taxpayercustomers will opt in; and that taxpayers who opt in and receive the alternative tax
regime will pay less per capita than the control group (thus requiring reimbursing
the government for some or all of the shortfall). The government should encourage
potential private intermediaries to brave such risks, to foster innovation and
experimentation in tax law.
A private intermediary might capture the benefits from its innovations in
several ways. The first intermediary to offer an alternative regime attractive to
many customers would have a first-mover advantage. An intermediary might earn
a good reputation for making taxpayer-customers happy, such as by increasing their
utility, or with good customer service. Moreover, an intermediary’s eligibility
criteria for each alternative tax regime should remain confidential,195 and thus
would be trade secrets, protected from misappropriation.196
But intermediaries may be discouraged from developing innovative
alternative tax regimes and eligibility criteria by the threat of copy-cat
intermediaries adopting the same regimes. Even though eligibility criteria for an
alternative tax regime might be confidential and protected as trade secrets,
competitors would likely at least observe which alternative tax regimes proved
successful, based on the first-mover’s continuing to offer them. From an ex post
Ser., Working Paper No. 17-15, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2988559
(comparing the U.S. regime to the rest of the world).
194
For a discussion of status changes with government-run tax experiments, see Abramowicz, supra note 47,
at 46-49.
195
The eligibility criteria would be filed with the government but not publicly disclosed. Keeping the eligibility
criteria confidential also has the benefit of preventing opportunistic taxpayers from planning their affairs to
qualify for an alternative tax regime that would give them a windfall.
196

See UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT (Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs of Unif. State Laws 1985).
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perspective, copying alternative tax regimes is desirable, because more competition
will drive down profit and increase the benefits from alternative tax regimes to
taxpayers (and potentially also to the government in the form of greater tax
collections). But from an ex ante perspective, intermediaries may not be willing to
undertake a risky new alternative tax regime without the opportunity to capture a
significant portion of the social gains if successful.
The intellectual property literature already provides guidance on mitigating
the risk that copying business methods will lead to too little innovation.197 The
government might address this problem by providing a time-limited exclusive right
to an intermediary that is willing to commercialize an alternative tax regime
strategy that no one else is willing to commercialize, absent the exclusive right. 198
Such a mechanism, however, would be unnecessary if intermediaries produced
extensive innovation without it.
III. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS

We have already considered objections to contractual tax reform internal to
the mechanism, such as whether the system might be gamed by short-term
contracts,199 insolvent intermediaries, 200 or filing status changes. 201 We now turn to
broader objections: that contractual tax reform might exploit participating
taxpayers or that it might have systemic negative effects on equity.
A. Taxpayer Exploitation
Historical evidence shows that reward structures for tax collectors can
create corruption and abuses.202 “Tax farming” helped precipitate the French
197

See Michael Abramowicz, Orphan Business Models: Toward a New Form of Intellectual Property, 124
HARV. L. REV. 1362 (2011); Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market
Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337 (2008) (cited by Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 652 n.51 (2010)
(Stevens, J., concurring)).
198
See Abramowicz, supra note 197, at 1396–99 (proposing a similar mechanism); Orphan Drug Act of 1983,
Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa–360ee) (providing limited exclusivity to
drugmakers willing to take the risks and cost of getting FDA approval for “orphan” drugs).
199

See supra Part II.B.3.
See supra Part II.B.4.
201
See supra Part II.C.2.
200

202

See CHARLES ADAMS, FOR GOOD AND EVIL: THE IMPACT OF TAXES ON THE COURSE OF CIVILIZATION (1993)
(collecting evidence from ancient Egypt, ancient Israel, ancient Greece, ancient Rome, the rise of Islam, the
Middle Ages in Europe, Cortes’s conquest of the Aztecs, pre-Revolution France, Tudor and Stuart England,
the revolutionary United States, as well as the modern world). Looking beyond just tax law, there is a
voluminous literature on the benefits and downsides of allowing private intermediaries to take on any function
previously performed by the government. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through
Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1291-1314 (2003) (providing a thorough summary of pro- and anti-
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Revolution203 and Roman tax collection practices204 made tax collectors the
quintessential sinners in the Christian gospels.205 In the Roman Empire and preRevolution France, the government sold the right to collect taxes to tax collectors,
who then had a profit incentive to squeeze as much money as possible from those
under their jurisdiction.206 Such arrangements do bear passing resemblance to
contractual tax reform, but only in that an intermediary stands between the taxpayer
and government.
Contractual tax reform differs from tax farming in crucial ways. First, tax
farming aimed to maximize revenues for the government and for tax farmers, but
contractual tax reform seeks primarily to increase taxpayer utility. Second,
participation is optional. By contrast, pre-Revolutionary French taxpayers could not
opt out of tax farming, although they sometimes tried to opt out by killing tax
farmers.207 Third, contractual tax reform would be governed by written alternative
tax regimes, regulated by the government to protect taxpayers, and subject to
judicial process. Tax farming did work relatively well in democratic ancient
Athens, where courts fairly adjudicated any disputes involving abuses by tax
farmers.208
The unpopularity of the IRS suggests that private tax collection could be an
improvement,209 but regulation must ensure that contractual tax reform does not
exploit taxpayers. We consider three different concerns: first, that private
privatization arguments); Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717 (2010);
Matthew Titolo, Privatization and the Market Frame, 60 BUFFALO L. REV. 493, 494 (2012); Peter F. Drucker,
The Sickness of Government, 14 PUB. INTEREST 3 (1969); JOHN VICKERS & GEORGE YARROW, PRIVATIZATION:
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1988); Chris Sagers, The Myth of “Privatization,” 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 37, 43–48
(2007) (collecting citations to privatization literature).
203

Id. at 223–35.
Id. at 81–102 (discussing tax collection in the Roman Republic and then early Roman Empire); see also id.
at 43–48 (discussing Roman tax collection, or attempts thereof, in ancient Israel).
204

205

In the Gospel of Luke, Jesus stayed with a tax collector named Zaccheus. Luke 19:1-10. This caused the
crowd to “grumble, saying, ‘He [Jesus] has gone to be the guest of a man who is a sinner.’” Id. 19:7. This
kindness caused Zaccheus to repent, give half his possessions to the poor, and promise quadruple restitution to
those he had defrauded, id. 19:8, whereupon Jesus announced, “Today salvation has come to this house.” Id.
19:9. In a separate chapter, Jesus tells a parable that includes a tax collector who “beat his breast, saying, ‘God,
be merciful to me, a sinner!’” Luke 18:9-14. In the Gospel of Mark, critics of Jesus ask His disciples, “Why is
he eating and drinking with tax collectors and sinners?” Mark 2:16. Jesus responds, “I did not come to call the
righteous, but sinners.” Id. 2:17.
206

Adams, supra note 202, at 81–82 (discussing the publicani of the Roman Republic); id. at 95 (noting that
even after Augustus moved away from the publicani, local governments would often use tax-farmers to collect
taxes on behalf of Rome); id. at 222–23 (discussing the pre-revolutionary French tax farming system).
207
See id. at 227–35 (discussing the gruesome ends met by many French tax farmers).
208

Id. at 66.
PEW RES. CTR., RATINGS OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 1 (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.peoplepress.org/files/2015/01/1-22-15-Favorability-release.pdf (showing that IRS is only federal agency with more
respondents having an unfavorable opinion of it than a favorable opinion).
209

CONTRACTUAL TAX REFORM

48

intermediaries might, like tax farmers of old, take advantage of unsophisticated
taxpayers; second, that contractual tax reform might adversely affect taxpayer
privacy; and third, that taxpayers might be coerced into making concessions to
private taxpayers, perhaps even unconstitutionally.
1. Deceptive Practices
Taxpayers may have relatively little information about private tax
intermediaries, and the alternative tax regimes might be complicated. (However,
the alternative tax regimes would often be far simpler than the existing voluminous
tax code.) Some intermediaries may seek to exploit any lack of information or
behavioral biases exhibited by taxpayers. For example, intermediaries may exploit
hyperbolic discounting210 by inducing taxpayers to enter into alternative tax regimes
that provide them lower taxes in one year but much higher taxes in later years. 211
This has the effect of a usurious loan, but it could be more pernicious if the
complexity of an alternative tax regime made it hard to recognize it as such. There
is a substantial debate in the literature about the extent to which the government
needs to protect consumers from themselves.212
Assuming taxpayers do need protection, a familiar approach is for the
government to police disclosure rigorously. In the wake of the financial crisis and
related mortgage abuses, Congress and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB) set out to simplify disclosures to mortgage applicants. 213 The invitation to
opt into an alternative tax regime could similarly require easy-to-read disclosures,214
including key comparisons such as how much tax would be due under the generally
210

See Richard Thaler, Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency, 8 ECON. LETTERS 201 (1981);
GEORGE W. AINSLIE, PICOECONOMICS 80, 109, 125, 228 & 371 (1992).
211
See authorities cited supra note 210; Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92
MINN. L. REV. 749 (2008); Stephan Meier & Charles Sprenger, Impatience and Credit Behavior: Evidence
from a Field Experiment (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, Working Paper No. 07-03, 2007),
http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/wp/wp2007/wp0703.pdf (showing consumers engaged in hyperbolic
discounting).
212
See Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, 5 DEMOCRACY 8 (2007) (arguing for protecting consumers in
financial transactions); see also M.S. Barr et al., The Case for Behaviorally Informed Regulation, 25 NEW
PERSP. ON REG. 41–42 (2009). The private sector’s profit motive may provide incentive for abuse, much as
some critics argue that banks exploit borrowers unable to afford loans. See, e.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg &
Michael Corkery, Surge in Loans Linked to Cars Is Hurting Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2014, at A1; Thomas
B. Edsall, Making Money Off the Poor, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR, Sept. 17, 2013,
https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/17/making-money-off-the-poor.
213

See Consumer Financial Protection Board, Integrated Mortgage Disclosures Under the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) and the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 79,730
(Dec. 31, 2013).
214
See Kali Jensen, The Plain English Movement’s Shifting Goals, 13 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 807, 808–17
(2010) (recounting the history of the Plain English movement).
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applicable law versus the alternative regime, for several scenarios likely for the
taxpayer. The government could also publish extensive data on the past
performance on each intermediary (and indeed on every alternative tax regime)
showing how taxpayers who opted in fared compared to control group taxpayers,
plus surveys of treatment-group taxpayers’ satisfaction. Whether or not government
enables contractual reform, the government will need to regulate similar
arrangements, such as the use of artificial intelligence in offering alternative
regimes for student loans.215
The government also might protect consumers with regulatory strategies
specific to contractual tax reform. The government might prohibit particular
provisions in agreements, or it might limit how far alternative tax regimes deviate
from generally applicable tax law (e.g., requiring tax rates to remain within 3% of
existing rates).216Similarly, the government might protect taxpayers by giving them
an option to cap the amount they must pay under the alternative tax regime. For
example, the government might specify that, in any year, a treatment-group
taxpayer may opt out of the alternative tax regime and pay only 110% of what the
taxpayer would have owed under the generally applicable tax laws. Such a cap
would limit intermediaries’ opportunistic behavior.217 In early stages of contractual
tax reform, the government could begin with a relatively low cap, but increase that
percentage over time if taxpayer exploitation does not become a problem.
2. Privacy Violations
Much of the population believes that the private sector already maintains
too much data about individuals.218 Contractual tax reform can incentivize
taxpayers to reveal private information, such as their earnings potential.219 This
private information, in turn, can be used to improve taxpayers’ utility while either

215

See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
An alternative, heavier-handed approach would be for the government to specify those terms that
the alternative tax regime might offer (e.g., permissible tax rates and a list of tax benefits that might
be removed). Of course, such as heavy-handed approach might stifle valuable innovation.
216

217

Private tax intermediaries could protect themselves by providing that liability to them shall be no less than
some percentage (say, 95%) of what the federal tax bill would have been, so that the requirement is not
asymmetric.
218
See Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jennifer M. Urban, Alan Westin’s Privacy Homo Economicus, 49 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 262, 278 (2014) (reporting survey data showing overwhelming majority of respondents worry about
private companies’ collection and use of personal information); Frank Pasquale, The Dark Market for Personal
Data, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2014, at A31.
219
See supra Section I.B.1 (encouraging taxpayers to reveal information about their earnings potential through
their decision to opt in or not); Section I.B.2 (encouraging taxpayers to reveal information about their work
versus leisure preferences through opting in or not).
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maintaining or increasing government revenues. But putting additional personal
information into private hands creates the potential for abuse.220
The debates around the privacy of personal data are well beyond the scope
of this article.221 But much concern about privacy could be addressed by simply
binding private tax intermediaries to the same tax information confidentiality
provisions that already severely restrict the IRS’s ability to disclose taxpayer
information.222
3. Unconstitutional Conditions
Arguably, the government should not coerce people to giving up their rights,
even by paying them to do so. The Supreme Court has developed a “doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions,” asking when a condition on receipt of a government
benefit is unconstitutionally coercive.223 Consider the example alternative tax
regime where shopkeepers receive a tax-rate discount, in exchange for consenting
to intensive electronic reporting.224 The taxpayers’ cash register and credit-card
machines would report all activity electronically to the intermediary, potentially
backstopped by a camera to prevent cash payments “under the table.” 225 The tax-

220

A related concern is that, once a taxpayer reveals private information about ability to an intermediary, the
government might act opportunistically, using that information to maximize revenues to the taxpayer’s
detriment. See BOADWAY, supra note 6, at 195–96 (discussing the problem of government commitment not to
misuse information about taxpayers). For example, if moderate earners with high earnings potential but high
preferences for leisure reveal these characteristics by opting into an alternative regime, the government in the
future could opportunistically raise the inframarginal rates on such taxpayers—thus pushing them to work
harder to maintain the same utility. Id.; see also Dagobert L. Brito et al., Dynamic Optimal Income Taxation
with Government Commitment, 44 J. PUB. ECON. 15 (1991).
221
See, e.g., HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL
LIFE (2010); Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805 (2010); Julie E.
Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1416–18,
1421 (2000); Jonathan D. Frieden et al., Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: Leveraging Private Enforcement
to Improve Internet Privacy, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1674, 1722–25 (2011); Lauren Gelman, Privacy, Free
Speech, and “Blurry Edged” Social Networks, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1315, 1342 (2009); Daniel J. Solove &
Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014);
authorities cited supra note 218.
222
I.R.C. § 6103.
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See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989) (attempting to
clarify the doctrine, which is “riven with inconsistencies”); Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism, 70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 620 (1990) (calling doctrine “too crude and too
general to provide help in contested cases”); accord Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 407 n.12 (1994)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Although it has a long history, . . . the ‘unconstitutional conditions’ doctrine has for
just as long suffered from notoriously inconsistent application”).
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See supra Section I.C.2.
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See id.
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rate discount is a government benefit, albeit one administered through a private
intermediary, and the intensive monitoring is a condition on receipt of that benefit.
If mandating intensive electronic reporting would be unconstitutional,226
perhaps conditioning receipt of a tax benefit on such reporting might be
unconstitutional too, though the use of private intermediaries makes this less likely.
A two-part test governs.227 First, there must be an “essential nexus” between a
“legitimate state interest” and the condition.228 Preventing tax avoidance is a
quintessential legitimate state interest,229 and monitoring businesses for unreported
income has a clear nexus with preventing tax avoidance.230 Second, there must be a
“rough proportionality” between the condition and the benefit.231 If all eligible
taxpayers opted in, that might indicate a lack of proportionality, suggesting that
shopkeepers believe they need to participate to remain competitive. But so long as a
substantial proportion of taxpayers decline to opt in, rough proportionality should
be presumed. A similar analysis would likely uphold any alternative tax regime
offered as opt-in.
B. Equality and Equity
1. Worsening Inequality
Unless carefully designed, contractual tax reform might worsen inequality.
Higher-income taxpayers tend to have better tax advisors, are less risk-averse, and
provide proportionally higher potential tax increases to cover the costs of designing
and administering an alternative tax regime. Intermediaries might focus their efforts
on providing Pareto-efficient alternative tax regimes only for the well-off. At its
worst, contractual tax reform would be like the bank system, which often leaves
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The Fourth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. IV, generally requires either warrants or an opportunity for
precompliance review before searching commercial records. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct.
2443 (2015). There is an exception only for closely regulated industries such as liquor sales, firearms dealing,
mining, and automobile junkyards. 135 S. Ct. at 2454.
227
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386; 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 7:5 (2016
ed.) (using the holding of Dolan to elucidate the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions).
228
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386; SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 227, § 7:5.
229
Colangelo v. United States, 575 F.2d 994, 998 (1st Cir. 1978) (finding “orderly assessment and collection
of taxes” to be a legitimate government interest); see also New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 313
(1937) (“Taxes are what we pay for civilized society”) (citation omitted).
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See supra notes 122-129 and accompanying text (discussing the “tax gap,” hundreds of billions of dollars
primarily resulting from unreported business income).
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Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391; SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 227, § 7:5.
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lower-income individuals without banking services (“unbanked”) or with only
limited access to banking services (“underbanked”).232
Yet contractual tax reform can be designed to maximize the utility of the
less-fortunate through progressive formulas regarding the allocation of profit (i.e.
the excess of taxes paid by treatment-group taxpayers over control-group
taxpayers). For example, when intermediaries offer alternative regimes to taxpayers
making over $200,000 per year, the government might allow the intermediary to
keep just 30% of all additional tax revenue generated by the treatment group, in
comparison to the control group. By contrast, when intermediaries offer alternative
regimes to taxpayers making under $40,000 per year, the government might allow
the intermediary to keep 100% of the additional tax revenue generated. Such
progressive formulas would incentivize creating alternative tax regimes that
increase lower-income taxpayers’ utility.233
2. Violating Horizontal Equity
Horizontal equity is the principle that taxpayers earning the same income
should pay the same amount of tax.234 Contractual tax reform presents two potential
violations of horizontal equity. First, the intermediary would not offer the
alternative tax regime to all taxpayers. Second, of those taxpayers invited to opt in
and who do opt in, the government will randomly assign some percentage to the
control group, who would be subject instead to the normal tax code.
The first objection—that not all taxpayers are invited to opt into every
alternative regime—is largely overcome by the fact that it is the private
intermediary, not the government, deciding who is invited. Suppose that two
individuals A and B both interview for a coveted private-sector job that pays
$10,000 more after taxes than their current job. It is unobjectionable that only one
of the two will get the job. This situation differs little from a private tax
intermediary offering an alternative tax regime, which will increase after-tax
232

See FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 2015, at 2–3 (Oct. 20, 2016),
https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2015/2015report.pdf.
233
This aspect of contractual tax reform is even more powerful if one considers “taxes” more broadly to include
not only monies raised from individuals, but also transfer payments (like anti-poverty programs) made to
individuals as negative taxes. This broader view of “taxes” is common in the economic literature. See, e.g.,
Akerlof, supra note 97; BOADWAY, supra note 6, at 152–80. Contractual tax reform for lower-income
individuals could thus be seen as a way to encourage privately run alternative regimes that help individuals
escape poverty, such as by eliminating the “welfare trap” of extremely high marginal rates that lower-income
individuals face as higher incomes cause large drops in their eligibility for various transfer payments under
anti-poverty programs.
234
See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 35, ¶ 3.1.4; cf. Alan J. Auerbach & Kevin A. Hassett, A New Measure
of Horizontal Equity, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1116, 1116 (2002) (“[T]here is virtual unanimity that horizontal
equality—the extent to which equals are treated equally—is a worthy goal of any tax system.”).
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income by $10,000, to only one of A or B. Indeed, the government itself already
uses invitations in tax administration. For example, the IRS has offered an
invitation-only “compliance assurance process” (CAP) that allowed for ex ante
(i.e., before return filing) resolution of large corporations’ tax matters.235 Current
tax law offers numerous elections into different substantive rules, often with
arbitrary conditions for eligibility.236
The second objection—that the government randomizes some taxpayers
who opt in into the control group—weakens when one considers that the IRS
already uses randomization to audit taxpayers. 237 Just as auditing provides valuable
information to the IRS, randomizing some taxpayers into the control group provides
valuable information on whether an alternative tax regime has increased tax
collections. A Kantian might object that randomization on individual taxpayers for
informational purposes violates the principle that each person should be treated as
an end rather than merely as a means.238 Even assuming the validity of this principle,
however, the randomization into the control group is not treating taxpayers solely
as a means. The goal of contractual tax reform is to better accommodate diverse
individual preferences, which increases autonomy.239 A Kantian would argue that
law has the imperative to respect each individual as an end in him- or herself,
including his or her freedom to pursue his or her own ends and conception of the
good life. Alternative tax regimes respect this imperative and are justifiable on
Kantian grounds.240
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Shamik Trivedi & Amy Elliott, LB&I Expands, Makes Permanent CAP Real-Time Audit Program, 131 TAX
NOTES 10 (Apr. 4, 2011); IRS, Compliance Assurance Process (CAP) — Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
(Sept. 16, 2015), 2016 TAX NOTES TODAY 167-35. Budgetary restrictions have led the IRS close CAP to new
participants as of 2017, despite its popularity. IRS, IRS Continues Comprehensive Assessment of the CAP
Program (Aug. 26, 2016), 2016 TAX NOTES TODAY 167-31.
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See, e.g., Treas. Reg. §1.1502-75(h) (setting forth mechanics for a group of corporations to opt into filing a
consolidated return); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1502-1 to -100 (governing the consolidated return tax regime); KEVIN
M. HENNESSEY ET AL., THE CONSOLIDATED TAX RETURN (2017 ed.) (treatise dedicated to the consolidated tax
return regime); id. ch. 2 (discussing the extensive requirements to be eligible to opt into the consolidated return
regime); see also, e.g., I.R.C. § 1362(a) (opting into being an “S corporation”); id. § 856(c)(1) (opting into
being a “real estate investment trust”).
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INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 4.1.3.2, which explains how a Discriminant Index Function affects the
likelihood that a taxpayer will be audited, and § 4.22.1.5(5), which allows the National Research Program to
choose taxpayers at random. For a broader discussion of randomization in tax administration, see Sarah B.
Lawsky, Fairly Random: On Compensating Audited Taxpayers, 41 CONN. L. REV. 161, 164–68 (2008).
238
See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 96 (H.J. Paton trans., Harper
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omitted)); see also Abramowicz et al., supra note 186, at 964 & n.128 (2012).
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Control group taxpayers may not get the same benefits as treatment group
taxpayers, but they are no worse off. It is common for governmental programs to
choose only a subset of applicants to participate,241 and contractual tax reform
simply won’t work if everyone participates. A control group taxpayer might still
benefit from randomization anyway, and not just because the experiment might
produce information that leads to better tax policy. The control group taxpayer one
time might be a treatment group taxpayer in another period.242 Meanwhile, an
intermediary in theory could offer insurance, with payoffs equal to the premium
divided by the probability of being randomized to control. Under expected utility
theory, “it is well established that a risk-averse individual will purchase full
insurance when the insurance contract is fairly priced.”243 That is, a rational
purchaser should buy just enough insurance to be indifferent to those outcomes.
Usually, insurance is expensive to provide because underwriting requires risk
assessment, but here the risk is transparent, so insurance should be cheap. If such
insurance is provided, to enable the insurance function to work, premiums should
not be deductible, and payouts should not be taxed.
IV. CONCLUSION

This Article has outlined how contractual tax reform could increase
taxpayer utility without adversely affecting government revenues. Private
intermediaries would design alternative tax regimes. Using artificial intelligence
and other data-based models, the intermediaries would invite certain taxpayers to
opt in. Of those who do so, the government would randomize some percentage to a
control group to measure the revenue that those subject to the alternative regime
would have raised if subjected to the generally applicable tax code. The
intermediaries either could be for-profit or could be cooperatives, operated for the
benefit of those who opt in. Regulation of insurers provides a model for regulating
the private tax intermediaries, who are similar in many ways. Particularly in early
implementations, the deviations from existing tax law would likely be relatively

different work versus leisure preferences).
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See, e.g., DAVID GREENBERG ET AL., SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION AND PUBLIC POLICYMAKING
225 (2003) (noting that the impossibility of serving all comers is a justification for randomization).
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We would not allow the control group taxpayer to contract with another intermediary in the same
year. In theory, the first intermediary’s tax bill might depend on whatever the control group taxpayer
pays to the second intermediary. But there is a danger of side payments, in which the first
intermediary rewards the second for giving a good deal to the taxpayer, lowering the intermediary’s
bill. This is much less worrisome across time periods.
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Michael Braun & Alexander Muermann, The Impact of Regret on the Demand for Insurance, 4
J. RISK & INS. 737, 737 (2004). Prospective insureds, however, do not always follow the
recommendations of expected utility theory. Id. at 738.
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small, but substantial benefits could still be achieved, including increased taxpayer
utility and increased government tax revenues.

